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I.

INTRODUCTION

entrepreneur is vitally concerned with selling methods.
Success depends upon sales. Sales depend upon desire for the
product. Desire for most products, including life insurance, is not
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inherent but is created by the efforts of the entrepreneur. In the case
of life insurance, an effective job of creating the desire, i.e., of selling, is usually necessary to convince a prospective insurance buyer
that over a long period he should allocate a significant portion of
his income to the purchase of an intangible such as life insurance.
In the constant effort to improve marketing methods in selling
life insurance, there has been a tendency in recent years to place
special emphasis on an investment theme. Many companies have
been selling life insurance as an investment akin to stocks or bonds
rather than as insurance as such. In the "affiuent society," even people in modest circumstances wish to share in what seems to them to
be irreversible, long-range appreciation in values which characterizes the world of finance. Any sales message that promises them
unwonted participation in the money-making activities of the
community, while simultaneously discharging an obligation to
their dependents, falls on receptive ears. A typical sales presentation of this kind may begin as follows:
"My company is interested in entering into a business
relationship with you that can be very profitable both for you
and for my company. Life insurance is a part of the program,
but I didn't come here to talk to you about that. Let's forget
the life insurance and consider only the making of money.
"This is a sample policy and here is a page of coupons.
They are colored green to look like money because they actually represent money. You can clip them out just like bond
coupons, and exchange them for cash. Better yet, these coupons
can be left on deposit with the company, which guarantees to
pay you not less than 3 1/2 percent interest. With the miracle
of compound interest working for you, you would then receive
in twenty years $3,500, which is almost $1,000 in excess of the
face value of the coupons.
"Now let's come to the most significant part of the contract.
You will share in every dollar the company earns. Not only do
you receive the usual dividend arising from the participating
business, but you also share in the profits generated by the
nonparticipating business. Let me ask you this. If you were to
invest $400 with complete safety, what would you consider a
fair rate of return on your investment? [After receiving the
typical response of five or six percent, the agent continues.]
Naturally four to six percent would be excellent, but of course
it would be taxable. However, last year our board of directors
declared a profit-sharing bonus of 12.5 percent, and that was
tax-free.... Not only is this return extraordinary, but it will
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almost certainly increase for you. This contract is sold only to a
limited number of charter members, who get in on the ground
floor where they can help the company grow. As the company
expands, the profits increase. Meanwhile, the number of
charter policyholders decreases through deaths and lapses.
Doesn't it figure that with a limited and decreasing number of
charter members sharing in ever increasing earnings, your
share should increase every year?
"In the usual life insurance contract two things build
equity for you-cash values and participating dividends. These
charter-investment contracts have both of these ordinary
sources of gain, but they add to them the guaranteed coupon
accumulation plus profit-sharing in all of the company's business.
"Furthermore, if you apply your coupons, your profitsharing dividends, and your regular participating dividends
to the reduction of premiums, in about ten years you reach a
point where there will be no more costs. That is, the balance
due on the premium payments is reduced to zero. In short,
as the company's earnings continue to increase after that, the
company will pay you to own the insurance policy. You have
a good life insurance policy. You receive annual dividend
checks. You pay no more premiums. How can you beat that?"
How can one fail to be impressed? Insurance is included as a
bonus in connection with a foolproof and lucrative investment.
Here is an opportunity for the prospect to discharge his moral obligation to provide insurance protection for his dependents, and
yet share in the investment opportunities of an affiuent society.
This seems a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to get in on the ground
floor. For once the prospect will not be on the sidelines watching
others make money; this time he will be one of the insiders. The
sales pitch abbreviated here is made, and successfully made, many
times each day. But the investment theme is not the only one used
in the modern marketing of insurance. Other appeals may be
added:
"Now most insurance companies are paying less than they
should when you die. You know, don't you, that your insurance policy is in part a savings account, and that there are cash
values in it, i.e., if you cash it in, you can get an amount of
cash that keeps increasing year after year. Every insurance
company is required by law to pay you this cash if you want to
end your policy, or to lend the money to you if you want to
keep your policy. The reason is that it is your money. Now
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you would think that when you die, the insurance company
would pay you the cash value of the policy as well as the insured sum. After all, you are paying annual premiums for
insurance protection, but the company is only paying you in
insurance the difference between the face of the policy and the
cash value. Now our policies are different. Not only do you
get the face value of our policy, but if you die in the tenth
year, or the fifteenth, or the twentieth, you will also get back
your accumulated premiums. We don't think anything less is
fair." 1
A. The Common Specialty Provisions
I. Tontine policies, or more accurately semi-tontine policies,
provide for the accumulation of dividends by the company for a
specified period. When the period expires, those policyholders who
have survived and have not .lapsed or surrendered their policies
share in the accumulated fund, to the exclusion of those who have
died or have lapsed. The foregoing hypothetical specialty policy
did not contain a tontine feature.
2. Profit-sharing policies are participating policies promising
the policyholder not only a share in the surplus created by this
particular class of policies, but also in surplus generated by some
other classes. Typically, profit-sharing policies share in the surplus
generated by the nonparticipating business, but occasionally they
share in surplus created by a separate class of participating policies
which are not profit-sharing.
3. Charter policies are sold at the beginning of a company's
career, and are issued with an assurance that they will be sold only
to a limited number of persons or for a limited total amount. The
charter policies themselves, or statements about the charter feature
made in the sales presentation, represent that the charter policyholder will receive a special advantage not available to persons
1 These sales talks are fictitious but have been constructed from ones actually in use
and from a written sales presentation in our files prepared by a company for use by its
agents. Except for its brevity, the presentations are not unrepresentative. Of course not
every specialty policy has all of these features in one contract, but some have a good many.
See Equitable Life &: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 310 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1962), for a case which
throws light on the nature of the sales presentations often used.
There are numerous variations on the themes adumbrated here. A well-known one
used in Indiana goes (in part): "You have been nominated-If you are an influential
citizen in your community, it is possible that you may someday be 'nominated' by some
life insurance company . • . . An opportunity to make a fine return on your moneyperhaps ten or twenty times the ordinary rate of interest on any other type of investment
or savings plan .•••" The use of the expression "nominated" bears the mark of genius.
It is hard to imagine it failing to produce results.
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holding later policies issued by the same company. Most often, the
special advantage is a profit-sharing feature; such charter policies
form a subclass of profit-sharing. policies.
4. Coupon policies contain a series of coupons in combination
with an insurance conttact. The coupons vary in their provisions,
but typically they mature in successive years, entitling the policyholder to a specified sum in cash, or to various alternative benefits.
Sometimes passbooks, resembling those in use by savings banks,
are used instead of coupons. There seems to be little difference in
principle between coupons and passbooks.
5. The return of premium provision promises to pay to the
beneficiary all of the premiums paid up to the time of the insured's
death in addition to the face amount, if the insured dies within a
specified period. This is merely a form of increasing term insurance.
6. The return of cash value provision is closely analogous to the
return of premium provision. It promises to pay to the beneficiary
the cash value of the pG>licy instead of the amount of premiums paid
in addition to the face amount, if death occurs within a specified
period. It, too, is a form of increasing term insurance.
7. The sight draft (immediate cash draft) provision is a feature
which promises to pay the beneficiary a certain percentage of the
face value of the policy if the insured dies within a specified period.
Characteristically it is paid quickly, with virtually no formalities.
It is merely a form of level term insurance.
As one may see from the above list, the specialty policies now
being sold, mostly by relatively small companies,2 consist basically of
standard components of life insurance, such as ordinary life, pure
endowments, and various forms of term insurance. For example,
the coupon provision is actuarially an endowment, while the return
of premium, return of cash value, and sight draft provisions, are
forms of term insurance. They are founded upon sound actuarial
methods, with reserves meeting minimum legal requirements. In
opposing new insurance department regulations, some of these
companies point to the orthodoxy of their policies. But by combining the traditional components in new ways and using un2 Although one specialty policy company has assets of over $4 billion, with more than
$10 billion of insurance in force, the vast -majority of specialty policy companies, numbering in excess of 200 as nearly as we can ascertain, operate on a much smaller scale. Most
of them have less than $10 million in assets, thirty have less than $1 million, while one
hundred have less than $5 million. Further, the overwhelming majority of these companies
have less than $100 million of insurance in force, more than twenty-five have less than
$10 million, and almost another fifty have less than $25 million. About half of these
companies are less than ten years old.
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orthodox and often misleading selling methods, that which is essentially traditional insurance coverage appears to be something
"special." While to the cognoscente the contract is merely a combination of usual components, the agents of the company may succeed
in giving the average prospect quite a different impression. Complaints filed with state insurance departments illustrate what the
prospect is led to believe:
"If we didn't draw out the dividends they would be so
large we wouldn't have to work."

"When the agents sold me these policies I was sold with
the idea that they were stock as well as protection and that
within ten years my return would exceed 400% and that I
could draw out the premium money at any time."
"We were told it was an investment, the life insurance
policy just an incidental." 3
Characteristically the effect of the sales presentation of specialty
policies is to give the prospect the impression that he is buying into
a profit-making opportunity rather than merely purchasing insurance. It is the possibility of deception rather than objection to the
actuarial characteristics of specialty policies that has led several
state insurance departments to promulgate rules regulating them.
Thus the Missouri regulation expresses its concern for "References
to a policy as being an 'investment,' 'investors', or 'profit-sharing'
policy, or the use of similar designations in such a manner as to
misrepresent the true nature of a life insurance policy . : ." or
"references to any policy or contract in such a manner as to misrepresent its true nature ...." 4
The objective of this article is to explore the various specialty
policies which are being used in American life insurance today,
to ascertain what problems are created for the public by the use
of such policies, and to ask whether they should be forbidden or
regulated and, if the latter, in what ways regulation can best be
worked out. We will examine first the reasons why life insurance
companies issue specialty policies, next the public policy objectives
that are of relevance to this subject, then the problems raised by
each major kind of specialty in succession, and finally we will present some general conclusions from the entire study.
3 Excerpts from letters and statements attached to a circular letter issued by the Neb.
Dep't of Ins., March 20, 1962. See also Stegman v. Professional &: Business Men's Life
Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 744, 252 P.2d 1074 (1953).
4 Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. XII-9, §§ 1, 2, Jan. 19, 1962.
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WHY SOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
WRITE SPECIALTY POLICIES

The life insurance business has long been extremely competitive, not only in price but in other ways. 5 But since life insurance
is sold, not bought, the key factor in life insurance competition has
been the agent. In the past, competition more frequently has led
to an increase in agency commissions than to a decrease in the price
to the policyholder, but in this century, and particularly since the
Armstrong investigation, a larger part of the competitive struggle
between insurance companies has tended to center either upon the
initial premium, or upon the net cost to the policyholder. Hence,
one of the reasons that many small companies give for issuing specialty policies is that they are allegedly unable to compete on the
basis of initial premiums or net cost. For example, one spokesman
for companies issuing specialty policies said:
"For the smaller company to meet low-cost competition headon with the same plan always places them in a tough position.
This should be avoided, if possible, by the use of unique plans
which do not permit comparison with the low-cost Ordinary
. ...."6
l1.fe po1·1c1es
In the attempt to compete in a market in which buyers are
increasingly price-conscious, two general approaches have been
employed, separately or in combination, in the preparation of
specialty policies. First, many of the policies supplement orthodox
insurance protection with investment features and other attractions in order to provide a maximum marketing appeal despite
admittedly high costs. Second, various orthodox insurance coverages are combined in such a way that the benefits vary greatly, and
cost comparison with the more traditional policies becomes impossible. In either of these two ways, the specialty company may
shift the competition from price to another basis.
The endeavor to succeed in selling life insurance in a highly
competitive market is laudable, even though it may sometimes lead
to shabby practices. But that is only one of the more praiseworthy
motives for the sale of specialty policies. Another motive is the
5 For extensive discussions of the history of life insurance with indications of its
competitive nature, see KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910 (1963); STAI.SON,
MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE 264-68, 342-45, 485, 582, 609 (1942).
o Comment made by Mr. Ritter, Assistant Secretary of the Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, participating in a forum, 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF AcruARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 52, 56. See also id., 366.
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provision of a favorable climate for the sale and manipulation of
stock, i.e., the sale of specialty policies is sometimes an aspect of a
stock promotion. An article in the Chicago Tribune describes the
modus operandi of such a scheme as used in Illinois:
"When the first 'public' issue runs out, a second one is
floated at a higher price, then a third at a still higher price if
the market will bear it, and so on.
"After a few such flotations, each at a higher price than its
predecessor, a secondary market is likely to develop that is
sufficiently strong to enable the 'founders,' if they wish, to
unload their original stock at a profit of several hundred percent.
"At this stage the initial promoter or team of promoters,
who of course are among the holders of founders' stock, may
do just that and pull out of the organization to go elsewhere
and do likewise.
"When they do, they leave behind no broken laws but a
lot of publicly held stock in an insurance company which, tho
actually operating, has yet to earn-or demonstrate that it
could ever earn-the accolades bestowed upon it in the course
of the stock promotion . . . .
"A promoter or team of promoters comes into town ...
and sets about lining up a dignified name or two carrying
weight locally on which to prop the projected company's
reputation.... Nothing illegal is proposed or contemplated.
A life insurance operation actually is organized and set in
business. Those who are attracted into the organization as
backers at the outset are issued founders' stock at a very low
price a share, perhaps $1 or less. Then a second stock issue is
brought out for sale to the public at a higher price. Nothing
essentially is wrong with that. The 'founders,' who do the
work of organizing' the business and theoretically take the
greatest risk, probably deserve to acquire some equity at lower
cost than the general public." 7
The sale of specialty insurance is resorted to in connection
with the promotion because it is the quickest and surest way to
put business on the books and to produce rapid increases in premium income, thus enhancing the likelihood of profitable stock
flotation. Where the founders of a company are mainly interested
7 Clark, New Illinois Law Hobbles Insurance Stock Promoter, Chicago Tribune, Jan.
27, 1960, pt. IV, p. 7, cols. 3, 4. "rrJhere have been a number of new companies that have
started with low priced stock, put what appeared to be a substantial amount of business
on the books, manipulated the stock, and then cashed in quickly." Probe, Jan. 22, 1959.
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in the promotion rather than in the insurance enterprise, they are
likely to move from state to state, forming a chain of companies
one after another. Some of the companies may live and some may
die; which they do matters little to the promoters.
There is no simple way to ascertain the extent to which specialty
policies are issued in order to sell stocks. If there were adequate
demonstration that the sale of specialty policies is crucial to such
stock promotions, and that the unavailability of specialty policies
would suffice to prevent speculative stock promotions, that might
be reason enough to forbid the use of all specialty features. In the
absence of such a demonstration, which cannot be made now,
specialty policies must largely stand or fall of their own weight,
not merely because they are or may be used in connection
with questionable promotional schemes. Their utility in that connection is certainly an argument for their prohibition, however.
Control of stock promotion abuses must then be treated as a separate problem, outside the scope of this article.8
The extent to which insurance companies issue specialty policies is uncertain and probably could not be ascertained even with
great effort. However, investigation shows that out of almost 1500
life insurance companies operating in the United States, approximately 200 issue policies containing one or more of the specialty
features. 0 Some of these companies are to be found in every
state except New York, the greatest concentration, however, being
in the South and Southwest. A few states in the Midwest also seem
hospitable to specialty insurance. These companies constitute over
8 The flotation of insurance stock issues is sometimes within the control of the Securi•
ties and Exchange Commission, sometimes of the state securities commissioner, and some•
times of the state insurance commissioner. The subject is too complex to be treated
briefly in a footnote, but it is a subject that would repay careful exploration.
o BES'I''s LIFE INS. REPORTS (1962 ed.). In supplying information to the publisher, some
companies mentioned special features. Moreover, if a company in either its summary of
operations or in its liability statement listed coupons or coupon accumulations, it was
counted as a coupon policy-issuing company. Of course, some companies that issued
coupon policies in the past but no longer do so, still have to report coupon accumulations
in financial statements. Thus a number of companies may have been included which
once were specialty companies but are no longer. With respect to profit-sharing policies,
companies having profit sharing only in connection with pension plans were not counted.
With respect to charter policies, the company was included if Best's reported it as issuing
a policy with a name like "Founders,'' "Charter,'' etc. Some such policies may be misnamed but the error is not likely to be significant. The authors also know from miscellaneous sources that a number of companies issuing special policies did not show up
in the above ways. There may also be other companies which provided no indication in
Best's and were not otherwise known to the authors. Nor does Best's include the most
recently formed companies. It is dear that the authors' lists are subject to a variety of
errors, but they do not all work in the same direction, and most of them tend to lead to
a conservative enumeration.
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thirteen percent of the total number of life insurance companies
(although by no means thirteen percent of the insurance written),
and touch an appreciable portion of the insurance buying public.
The fact that nearly thirty states have recently reacted to the use
of specialty policies with some form of regulation is also some indication of their widespread use.
It is difficult to state with certainty that small new companies
must avoid direct price competition in order to survive. In a regime
of free contract, this question does not often arise as a concern of
the legislator, for one begins with the assumption that an entrepreneur should be free to vary his product as he likes in order
to compete effectively. Freedom of competition, freedom of contract, and freedom of access of new entrepreneurs to the market
are different aspects of a value which ranks high in our system.
Whether a competitive judgment is wise is not generally a question
for the law but for the entrepreneur himself. However, the present
article will discuss weighty considerations which have been urged
in favor of restriction or prohibition of specialty policies. No reliable judgment can be reached on the question of whether to regulate or prohibit until one studies the probable consequences of
such action. One must ask whether direct price competition would
really be fatal to small companies, as is often alleged. If it would
be fatal, a desire to preserve free access to the market should lead
the legislature to be cautious in instituting controls which would
seriously handicap new companies; if it would not be fatal, it
should be less reluctant to impose controls. The following paragraphs deal briefly with this question.
The net cost of an insurance policy depends upon three elements-the cost of mortality, the rate of return on invested assets,
and the level of the expenses of the company. It is difficult to see
why the small company should be at any competitive disadvantage
with respect to mortality costs. Given equally careful underwriting, mortality experience should be essentially independent of the
size of the company. 10
So far as return on investment is concerned, although an important part of the investment market is closed to the small company with relatively small amounts to invest, there is no reason to
suppose that a well-managed investment program for a small company cannot net approximately the same return as that for a larger
one. 11 A more significant difference in the net cost of insurance
10
11

See 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55.
"These smaller COIQ.panies have historically earned a higher net return on their
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policies has been said to arise from differences in operating expenses. Thus one official of a large company pointed out that " ...
the trend is more and more toward mechanization, and the larger
companies are first to take advantage of this. Also, the smaller
company generally pays higher commissions ...." 12 But the advantage of mechanization is easy to overemphasize. Small companies may be able to use service bureaus that provide mechanical
or electronic devices for a rental fee. 13 In addition to the advantage
of utilizing mechanical means for the handling of office routine,
the large company with a tried and proven product and an established name is in an advantageous position in the competitive
search for good agents. It is difficult to build a first-class agency
force for a new and unknown small company. Some strong inducements are said to be necessary, hence it is common to rely upon
higher commissions and the issuance of specialty policies having
great marketing appeal in order to counteract the advantages of the
big well-established companies in seeking agents. 14 The new small
companies apparently are forced to accept somewhat less-qualified
persons as agents than do the larger companies. They also generally
limit their portfolio to a small number of attractive policies, confine
preparatory instruction to the fundamentals, and then often provide the new agents with a "canned" sales talk for the one or two
policies they will sell.15
investments in the past. This has been a most helpful subsidy to their growth." Bensten,
Small Companies-Lemons or Lemonade?, 1960 GENERAL PROCEEDINGS: AMERICAN LIFE
CONVENTION 238, 242. "As to interest, can a smaller company make more selective investments and gain a higher interest rate? Probably not, but they might be able to equal that
of a larger company." 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC
PRACTICE 55.
12 Ibid. A recent study of costs throws much light on this question. Owsley, Cost
Factors in Life Company Management, The Insurance Field, Sept. 13, 1963, p. 24.
13 "The Service Bureau Corporation ••• is equipped economically to provide special
services of the type most Life companies need. Small companies which feel that they
cannot afford IBM installations of their own would do well to investigate their use."
Lindon G. Hughen, Comptroller of National Equity Life of Little Rock, Arkansas, as
quoted in Leslie, Means and l\fethods of Expense Reduction in Smaller Companies,
1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 64, 78. "Within
••• [recent] years smaller companies have been finding good, efficient use for computers
•••• (T]he use of service-bureau computers has given smaller companies which do not
have sufficient volume a chance to profit from computers." "\'\Tilliam Smith, of International
Business Machines Corporation, while participating in a forum, 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS:
CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 87, 91. "The automation of lower volume
companies is well on the way to solution. ,ve are even led to hope that mass production
of the smaller computers will lead to a cost basis for these machines that will give us
comparable cost ratios with the largest computers." Bensten, supra note 11, at 240.
14 Borchardt, Agency Contracts and Financing Plans, 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 39.
Hi Id. at 39-40. Borchardt goes on to say that "the nucleus of an excellent agency
organization can be built up of such inexperienced men." Ibid.
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It is not clear how far the advantages of size extend. It is easy
to overemphasize the economies of scale, and we suspect there are
also disadvantages to great size. The ten largest companies have a
smaller percentage of the market now than they had in 1950.16
In any case, the difficulties of starting a company have not been
so substantial as to prevent the formation of many new ones;
the number of legal reserve life insurance companies operating
in the United States doubled during the 1950's, and not all of
these new companies sold specialty policies.17 A more important factor than size in the success of any company is the quality
of management and other top personnel. Much of the inherent
advantage of large size can be reduced by intelligent and economical operation of the beginning company, especially as manifested
by the choice of an unsaturated market as a starting point. The
large companies have no monopoly on either management or sales
talent, and even in straight price competition small companies need
not be left behind. 11a Nor is price competition necessarily decisive.
One life insurance executive feels that "price competition can be
weak competition. Many of the best agents do not even carry a
rate book. Salesmanship is still the key to real success in our business ... and it is here that the younger companies have been leading the way." 18
Indeed, not only is it possible for a small company to compete
without specialty policies, as is demonstrated by the success of many
of them in so doing, but there is some doubt whether such policies
contribute to the ultimate success of a new company.19 Dissatisfied
policyholders will lead to lower persistency, which will detract from
16 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1962, § 3, p. 1, col. 2. See also figures provided in [1963]
LIFE INS. FAcr BOOK 18; 68 LIFE INS. COURANT 66 (April 1963); 56 LIFE INS, COURANT 56
(April 1951).
17 Our survey of Best's revealed many new small companies that apparently do not
issue the specialty policies discussed in this paper. Moreover, there seem to be small com•
panies that make it a point of pride to succeed while using only traditional forms. See
also Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of a Proposed
Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 82 Oan, 1962). But see Brief for
General Life Insurance Corporation in Opposition to Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 35.
17a For example, the following are actual premiums for a nonparticipating ordinary
life policy for $10,000, for a male, at age 35:
New or small company # 1
$190.70
New or small company # 2
$207.50
New or small company # 3
$190.60
New or small company # 4
$187.70
The average premium of five large, well established stock companies is $191.20.
18 See 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55.
19 See, e.g., Mr. Farrant, Vice-President and Actuary of British Pacific Life Ins. Co.,
1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55-59.
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the competitive position of the company. If the purchaser of a
specialty contract is oversold and is disappointed, the company's
public relations will grow weak as the policy grows older. Moreover, agents recruited to sell specialty policies are not inclined to
stay with the company if it shifts to more conservative practices.20
But whether or not the advantages of a specialty policy outweigh its disadvantages, many small companies treat the specialty
policy as the key to success and insist upon trying it out. In the
absence of persuasive considerations urging the regulation of specialty policies, the small company should be free to try whatever
measures it thinks will improve its position. Freedom in the marketplace is still a value in our society which receives and should receive
substantial weight. But it is not an absolute; it must be weighed
against other relevant values which urge restriction upon freedom
of contract. This leads to a consideration of the important values
which are thought to be implicit in insurance law, and to which
the law regulating specialty policies must adjust.

III.

THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING
REGULATION

At the 1962 Annual Meeting of the National Association of Life
Companies (NALC),21 attention was focused upon the increasing
number of states regulating, or proposing to regulate, specialty
policies. There were many expressions of protest that these regulations were being used by the larger companies to exclude the
20 "A specialty-type salesman, as a rule, is an individual who will drift from company
to company." Raymond Strong, consulting actuary, participating in a forum, 1960-1961
PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 59. William K. Robinson, consulting actuary, said in another meeting of the same organization, "Whatever the circumstances arc, at some time in the company's future there must be a change to the orthodox
plans of insurance. This may come as a very drastic change and affect the agency force
to a great extent. Companies have done quite well selling a 'founders' contract but have
found their men woefully untrained and completely inadequate when attempting to sell
the orthodox plans. The result has been a very substantial drop in volume." 1956-1957
PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 144.
21 The National Association of Life Companies was originally organized in Atlanta,
Georgia in January 1955, under the name "National Institute of Life Insurers." It consisted of approximately one hundred southern life insurance companies. In February it
changed its name and enlarged its membership to about 160 companies. One important
reason for the formation of this association was to resist the anti-tontine bill sponsored
by the National Association of Life Underwriters (NALtJ) and to defend the use of
specialty policies by small companies. See note 46 infra. See the National Underwriter,
Life Ed., Jan. 14, 1955, p. I, and Feb. 18, 1955, p. 14; Insurance Advocate, Jan. 15, 1955,
p. 31, and Feb. 19, 1955, p. 26; United States Review, Jan. 15, 1955, p. 24; The Eastern
Underwriter, Jan. 14, 1955, p. l; The Spectator, March 1955, p. 28. The NALU bill may
be seen at two stages of maturity in Life Ass'n News, Nov. 1954, p. 147, and May 1955,
p. 86. See note 46 infra for the final text.
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smaller companies from the market. Ellis Arnall, Chairman of
Coastal States Life Insurance Company and Chairman of the
NALC, declared:
"Little business in every field asks nothing of big government
or big business except fair play. Little business, as represented
by nearly 1,000 small, growing, vigorous life companies, asks
nothing except the application of the same rules to them and
their large competitors."22
The meeting passed a resolution which admonished
" ... NALC member companies to take cognizance of and prepare to fight the 'stringent restrictions' which are being enacted by several states against certain special policies. The association feels that these restrictions are prejudiced in favor of
the larger companies and that it has an equal right to compete
freely insofar as its conduct is not injurious to the public."28
Joseph J. McCaffery, President of State Life of Montana, issued a
call to battle:
"[The association] has resisted the tidal wave of opposition
[to specialty policies] .... [T]his encroachment on the right of
free competition must be eradicated....The determination of
the boundaries of 'public interest' should be established by
policyholder demands and not by departmental regulation
made without consideration accorded to individual or group
needs and desires for protection."24
Whether there should be regulation or even prohibition of
specialty policies, and if there should be regulation, what kind it
should be, depends on the public policy objectives which our society
decides are important and seeks to implement. It is necessary here
to sketch briefly the principal objectives of insurance law applicable
to this problem.25
The most important public policy objective of insurance law is
the preservation of the solidity of the insurance company. However,
this objective has little importance in the present context, for the
specialty policy offers no particular threat to solidity. In general, it
is actuarially sound. A second important objective of insurance
The National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 11, 1962, p. 15, col. 3.
Id. at 21, col. I.
24 Ibid.
25 See generally Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. R.Ev. 471 (1961).
22

23

1963]

SPECIALTY POLICIES

181

regulation is, however, to ensure that in the relations between the
policyholders and the insurance companies there will be reasonableness, equity and fairness. A good deal of insurance law and
regulation consists of efforts to police the insurance transaction and
the relationships created by it, mainly for the protection of the
policyholder in these respects. This important objective justifies
and explains a great deal of intervention in the insurance transaction, and is relevant in any discussion of specialty policies.
The foregoing goals or purposes of insurance law are related to
the effective functioning of the insurance institution itself. Without
solidity and cequum et bonum, or "purity of the market" as one
might call the congeries of related goals mentioned above,26 the
insurance institution does not perform its basic social function. But
in addition, various general aims of our society impinge upon the
insurance institution as (}Verriding goals. Some of them lead to
more legal intervention in the insurance enterprise; some lead us
to eschew intervention. Some of the objectives are related to our
political values; some are social and economic; some are moral. The
whole range of goals having impact on insurance law has been
studied in detail elsewhere; 27 here they are described only so far
as is important for present purposes.
A goal that operates to limit and restrict intervention is the
goal of liberty, by which is meant the absence of governmental
interference in private relationships and private transactions. In
the field of contracts especially, private autonomy is a value that
has been and should be given great weight in our society. It reflects
an underlying judgment that a central bureaucracy cannot, in general, make decisions which primarily affect only individuals as wisely
as can the individuals themselves. Under the name "freedom of contract" this value reached its zenith in the latter part of the nineteenth century as one aspect of the translation of the doctrines of
economic liberalism into law. To a considerable extent, the value
of freedom of contract even became imbedded in the Constitution
as one facet of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In this century, however, there has been a substantial reduction in
the value accorded to freedom of contract. Its constitutional protection has all but disappeared. But even if it no longer has the
status of a constitutionally protected right, it is still a factor of importance in deciding whether to enact specific regulatory or pro2a There is no suitable expression for this related group of objectives; they have been
designated collectively as <Equum et bonum, for want of a better term. Id. at 486.
27 See Kimball, supra note 25.
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hibitory proposals. It is here asserted that freedom of contract is a
value so weighty that there should be regulation or prohibition of
a freely contracted agreement only after a persuasive case has been
made for such intervention. This value creates a presumption
against government intervention in the private autonomy of freely
contracting parties. This is true even if the contract in question is a
contract of adhesion, so long as the market is competitive in the
sense that, although there is no practical possibility for an individual policyholder to negotiate terms with an insurer, there is at
least the opportunity for him to shop around in a market in which
a variety of products is available.
Another value of American society that sometimes puts restrictions upon the intervention by the legislature and the courts in
the insurance business, but at other times demands it, is the value of
freedom of access to the insurance market for new entrepreneurs.
This is related to the freedom of the individual insurance company,
once admitted to the market, to compete without artificial restrictions upon the market by monopolistic controls. But neither freedom of contract, nor freedom to enter the market, nor freedom
from domination of the market by self-appointed private guardians of the public weal is an absolute value. All are values only
to the extent that they contribute to the welfare of the community. The justifications for a competitive economic system are
(1) that it presumably produces higher quality and lower cost
products than can be produced under any other and (2) that it
provides a more congenial climate for political and social freedom
(which come close to being absolute values). Control by government is cumbersome, difficult, and of uncertain consequence,
and should be engaged in only so far as its effects are demonstrably
good. The regulator himself has no monopoly on wisdom, and the
facts upon which he must act are seldom clear. However, it is impossible to oppose regulation or prohibition directed at the prevention of fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading practices,
particularly if the form of intervention is mild. Interference that
merely assures policyholders the power to make an informed
choice when they purchase insurance does not really decrease economic freedom; in a real sense it enlarges it. Competition can work
well only if the purchaser is "able and willing to discriminate between articles offered by different competitors ...." 28
28 PAITERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 246 (1927). In his
special message to Congress on March 15, 1962, President Kennedy said: "Misleading,
fraudulent or unhelpful practices . • • are clearly incompatible with the efficient and
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One makes part of the case for intervention in life insurance
by pointing to the complexity of the contract. The average buyer of
life insurance is nearly helpless in considering the elaborate, technical, and varying policies available in the market. This helplessness
is more evident when there is completely unrestrained freedom, because the life insurance contract, at best difficult to understand, can
then appear in any number of variations.29
The proponents of specialty life insurance policies have usually
framed the issue as one of struggle between the old, giant, established insurance companies and the new, small, imaginative companies seeking to find a place in the market and to create a more
competitive environment. The theoretical justification for free
enterprise is that a competitive climate provides incentive to produce new and better products. If it is true that the regulation or
prohibition of specialty policies is a weapon of established companies, utilized to keep new companies out of the business and
to parcel out the market, then of course there should be great
reluctance to impose such regulation or prohibition. On the other
hand, there is a mystique about the idea of competition which can
be and is used in an effort to justify many questionable practices.
At the present time, few uninterested persons could be found to
proclaim the merits of competition altogether unrestrained by law.
New entrepreneurs have no natural right to have access to the
market on any terms they may choose. The basic right is the right
of the policyholder and of society rather than of the entrepreneur.
It is legitimate to place limits upon the competitive freedom of
both new and old companies for good reasons, and the problem is
only to determine what limits are desirable to impose.
The question can best be formulated in these terms: Are the
circumstances under which specialty policies are now issued in the
American life insurance market such that the public interest would
be served by regulation or prohibition of these policies, taking into
consideration both the desirability of reasonableness, equity, fairness, and transparency of the market on the one hand, and freedom
equitable functioning of our free competitive economy." N.Y. Times, March 16, 1962,
p. 16, col. 8. "[The consumer has the] right to be informed-to be protected against fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other practices,
and to be given the facts he needs to make an informed choice." Id., col. 2.
29 "It is hard enough for the layman to understand the workings of the life insurance
contract. It is the duty of the insurance industry in the public interest to simplify the
phraseology and provisions, not to add that which intends to confuse and complicate."
Testimony of Arthur Gordon, of the International Union of Life Insurance Agents, Hearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 104 Gan. 1962).
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of access to the market and freedom to contract without government
intervention on the other? Are the dangers of deception in specialty
policy marketing so substantial and so deleterious that freedom of
entrepreneurs must be restricted to prevent the deception? If so,
can effective methods of control be devised which do not limit
freedom unnecessarily, or is prohibition the final solution? The
answer will not necessarily be the same for each kind of specialty
provision; the question must be answered separately for each set of
circumstances. It seems quite conceivable, although perhaps not
likely, that one solution would be best in New York and another
in South Dakota, or that one answer would be justified in 1925
while the circumstances of 1963 demand another. Certainly one
answer may be appropriate for the tontine or the profit-sharing
policy, and quite another for the return-of-premium provision.
With this brief introduction to the public policy considerations applicable in this field, let us proceed to a discussion of the
specialties offered and of the problems each raises, dealing with
some lightly and with some in detail.

IV.

ToNTINE POLICIES

Speculative insurance is not a new invention. The tontine, or
the semi-tontine, has been a feature of the American life insurance
scene for nearly a century. It is an application to life insurance of a
speculative device proposed by Lorenzo Tonti toward the end of
the seventeenth century as a way to resuscitate the sagging finances
of the French state. A fund was collected from lenders, and each
year interest was paid on the loan. Subscribers were divided into age
classes, each constituting a closed group, and each year the interest
on the fund was divided among the surviving members of the class.
The principal sum was never repaid, all obligations of the state
ceasing upon the death of the last subscriber. The appeal was to
the speculative instincts of the subscribers, for the longer-lived
among them eventually realized very handsome incomes by receiving an ever-increasing share of the interest on the entire sum
originally contributed by all subscribers of the class. On the other
hand, the short-lived subscribers lost a great deal. The tontine was
in use into the eighteenth century as a means of raising revenue for
the military adventures of European states.80
In the United States, tontine life insurance dates from 1868,
when the Equitable introduced its "Tontine Dividend Life Asso See 2

ENCYC.

Soc. Ser. 70 (1930).

1963]

SPECIALTY POLICIES

185

surance Policies." 31 Basically the tontine was a standard participating policy, with the payment of dividends on the policy deferred for
ten, fifteen, or twenty years. Those who died forfeited any interest
in the dividends, though not in the face value of the policy; those
who lapsed forfeited both dividends and the reserve. The accumulated dividends and forfeitures for each class of policies were paid
to those policyholders whose policies were still in force. There was
no guarantee as to the amount of the "jackpot," but on the basis of
estimates that two out of three policyholders would lapse, the predicted profit would be very substantial indeed. This original tontine plan was soon modified into the semi-tontine, in which there
was no forfeiture of reserve values upon lapse. The amount of the
premium in excess of the amount allocated to expense, losses, and
to the legal reserve of the policy was not distributed as an annual
dividend, but constituted the source from which the tontine, or
accumulated fund was built. As before, only the survivors whose
policies were still in force shared in the accumulated dividends.
The semi-tontine was known under various names, such as the
"deferred dividend," "dividend endowment," "reserve dividend,"
"life rate endowment," or the "dividend investment" policy. 32
The success of the tontine or semi-tontine was phenomenal,
most of the companies in the business using it. Riding on it, the
Equitable advanced rapidly to first place. Those leading companies
that declined to embrace the tontine slipped badly in relative rank.
For example, measured by insurance in force, the Connecticut
Mutual dropped from second in 1875 to fourteenth in 1905, while
Mutual Benefit dropped from fourth to eighth.33
Soon the abuses to which the semi-tontines were susceptible
were revealed by the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly
of the State of New York Appointed To Investigate the Affairs of
Life Insurance Companies, better known as the Armstrong Committee. The fact that the policyholders, even if they did survive the
tontine period, would not receive an amount even approaching
their expectations became clearly evident. This was mainly the
result of three factors. First, there was a decline in interest rates,34
31 BULEY, THE EQUITABLE 27 (1959). The American Tontine Life and Savings Ins. Co.
of N.Y. issued the tontine earlier in the same year, but the Equitable action was the
significant beginning. Id. at 28.
.
82 See 1 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE
INSURANCE 93-96 (1953); STAI.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 487-88.
33 STAI.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, table B, at 798-801.
84 Id. at 242; REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMIITEE OF THE SENATE AND AssEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK .APPOINTED To INVESTIGATE THE AFFAlRS OF LIFE INSURANCE Co11rPANIES 427 (1906) [hereinafter cited as the ARMSTRONG REPORT].
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for which no blame can be attributed to the companies. Second,
although agents made no binding promises as to the amounts that
would ultimately be distributed to the policyholder, they made
very confident predictions which were not borne out by events.85
Third, the accumulated fund was easy prey for costly and sometimes
dishonest business practices because "there was a relative lack of
legal accountability for the funds thus accumulated, since they were
beyond the legal reserve." 86 Sometimes these large surpluses were
neither properly accounted for nor allocated to the policyholders,
but were squandered in extravagance and corruption.
Charles Evans Hughes, later Governor of New York, presidential candidate, and Chief Justice of the United States, served as
legal counsel to the Armstrong Committee. He spoke to the crux
of the problem when he said that "of all the reforms suggested by
the Committee, nothing ... is more imperatively demanded than
that the companies should be compelled to exhibit the results of
their management by annual accounting," and that "there seems
to be general agreement that the abuses which inevitably flow
from the control of large accumulations, said to be held for policy
holders but not the subject of any definite obligation, make this
necessary." 37 The requirement of an annual distribution of dividends appeared to provide the solution by preventing the long-term
accumulation of funds which in the past had, by reason of accessibility and comparative lack of legal controls, constituted a financial resource available for many questionable practices. Furthermore, a required annual distribution would eliminate a prime
source of misrepresentation and exaggeration, namely the speculative idea that the policyholder would share an ever-increasing fund
with an ever-decreasing number of persons.
After the Armstrong Committee Report the New York Legislature wasted little time in enacting a statute, effective January I,
1907, requiring an annual apportionment and distribution of dividends to the policyholders. 88 About one half of the states seem to
have followed New York's lead by requiring annual apportionment
and distribution of dividends. 89 A few states by statute require dis85

Kimball, The Role of the Court in the Development of Insurance Law, 1957 WIS.

L. REv. 520, 539; see ARMSTRONG REPORT 422-33.

Kimball, supra note 35, at 539; ARMSTRONG REPORT 422-33.
429.
38 This is now N.Y. INSURANCE CoDE § 216.
39 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.360 (1949); TEXAS INS. CoDE, Art. 11.12 (1963); Wis.
ANN. § 206.13(1) (1957).
86

87 ARMSTRONG REPORT

STAT.
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tribution no less often than every five years; 40 a few states prohibit
the tontine by departmental regulation. 41
After the wave of legislation which followed the Armstrong
Committee's report, it was easy to suppose that the tontine policy
was of little more than historical interest. It is probably true that it
never died completely, but until recently it appears not to have
been common after being discredited early in the century. Lately,
however, the semi-tontine seems to have been resurgent,42 although
it would be impossible to obtain quantitative data as to the number
of such policies issued. A memorandum submitted in 1954 to the
Laws and Legislation Committee of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners by the National Association of Life
Underwriters stated that despite the various anti-tontine statutes
"certain companies are becoming so adept at circumventing these
laws that it has become necessary to enact some specific anti-tontine
legislation."48 In the same year one insurance newspaper stated in
an editorial that
"there has been a considerable increase in the writing of tontine policies in the south, the southwest and the southeast....
[A]n increasing number of companies, especially the newer
and smaller ones, are managing to get a good start during their
early years by specializing in the sale of tontine contracts."
The editorial declared that "on the evidence it can no longer be
doubted that tontine policies are definitely on the increase."44
Lending strong support to the conclusions drawn in these sources
is the fact that some departmental regulations· prohibiting tontine
policies have been promulgated in recent years. 45 Furthermore, in
response to an anti-tontine bill sponsored by the National Association of Life Underwriters,46 nearly a hundred small insurance
companies formed an association which was later to become the
E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.14020 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1603 (1955).
E.g., Ala. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Sept. 23, 1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER,
[1955] !Ns. DEPT. SERVICE [for] .ALABAMA 3; Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. 152A, Aug. 8, 1961; Ga.
Dep't of Ins. Order, May 26, 1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, [1955] INS.
DEP'T SER.VICE [for] GEORGIA 10.
42 "This plan [semi-tontine], which most people supposed had passed out of existence,
experienced a revival in 1955 in Texas and a few other states. It was also known as the
'survivorship bonus' plan." R.n:GAL & MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 286 (4th
ed. 1959). Another term is "Special Persistency Fund." Prospectus of Surety Life Insurance
Company, March 15, 1960, p. 28.
48 [1954] 2 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 290.
44 The National Underwriter, Life Ed. (editorial comment), Oct. 29, 1954, p. 14, cols.
1, 2, reproduced in [1955] l PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. II7.
411 See note 41 supra.
40
41
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National Association of Life Companies, the primary purpose of
which was to defend against the further enactment of anti-tontine
legislation.47 In reporting that Alabama had issued a formal directive prohibiting the sale of tontine and semi-tontine policies, one
paper stated that about thirty companies had been issuing such
policies. 48 This evidence gives justification for assuming that tontine type policies have been issued in recent years on a fairly extensive and increasing scale.
Why has there been such a resurgence? The issuance of tontine
and semi-tontine policies prior to the Armstrong expose showed
that often the combination gambler and family man that resides in
most of us responds favorably to a combination of life insurance
with a speculative element. Even buyers who would never gamble
One version of the bill is found in [1954] 2 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 291:
SUGGESTED BILL OUTLAWING TONTINE, SEMI·TONTINE, OR "JACK·POT" POLICIES
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Insurance Code to the contrary, no life
insurance policy other than Group Insurance shall hereafter be delivered in this State:
"(l) Which does not constitute the entire contract between the parties and which does
not provide in the contract the amount and manner of payment of benefits, and the consideration therefor.
"(2) Which contains a provision for the segregation of policyholders into mathematical
groups and providing benefits for a surviving policyholder or policyholders of a group
arising out of the death of another policyholder or policyholders of such group, or under
any other similar plan.
"(3) Which contains a provision providing benefits or values for surviving or contin•
uing policyholders contingent upon the lapse or termination of other policyholders,
whether by death or otherwise.
"(4) Which contains a provision that on the death of anyone not specifically named
therein, the owner or beneficiary of the policy shall receive the payment or granting of
anything of value."
NALU submitted a revised version to a later meeting of NAIC. [1955] 1 PROCEEDINGS
OF N.A.I.C. 116; Life Association News, May 1955, p. 86:
46

.

SUGiESTED ANTI·TONTINE BILL

"No life insurance company shall hereafter deliver in this state, as a part of or in
combination with any insurance, endowment or annuity contract, any agreement or plan,
additional to the rights, . dividends, and benefits arising out of any such insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, which provides for the accumulation of profits over a
period of years and for payment of all or any part of such accumulated profits only to
members or policyholders of a designated group or class who continue as members or
policyholders until the end of a specified period of years. Nor shall any such company
deliver in this state any individual life insurance policy which provides that on the death
of anyone [other than a beneficiary,] not specifically named therein, the owner or beneficiary of the policy shall receive the payment or granting of anything of value."
The words in brackets are in the Life Association News, but not in the NAIC Proceedings. They represent a modification proposed subsequent to submission to NAIC.
47 See note 21 supra. The provisional head of this new organization, Claude H. Poindexter of Coastal States Life Insurance, said that "the primary reason for organizing was
as a defense against the efforts of the National Association of Underwriters to obtain
legislation outlawing what it has referred to as tontine or semi-tontine policies." See
National Underwriter, Life Ed., Jan. 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 4.
48 National Underwriter, Sept. 30, 1955, p. 1, col. 2; Ala. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Sept. 23,
1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, [1955] INS. DEP'T SERVICE [for] ALABAMA 3.
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in more direct ways may find the speculative aspects of the tontine
attractive. This lesson either has not been forgotten or has been
relearned and has produced the modern development of the semitontine policy as well as the other policies containing speculative
features discussed in this article.
A. Disadvantages of the Tontine
Several objections have been urged to the issuance of the semitontine policy. It has been denounced as a gambling contract, as
especially susceptible to misrepresentation, and as leading to waste
and graft. Each of these suggested objections will be discussed
separately.

I. Speculative Nature of the T ontine
It has often been said that the tontine or semi-tontine is bad
in itself-that it is a gambling contract and therefore should be
made illegal, even if it could be kept under adequate control and
even if no abuses were chargeable to it.49 This contention is based
upon the fact that a larger return may be received than is justified
by the premiums paid for the individual policy; i.e., the lucky
policyholder who survives and does not lapse receives a return
that is much larger than would be provided him by ordinary insurance. Conversely, the unlucky policyholder who dies early or
who lapses loses part of the premium which he has paid. This is
said to be gambling and properly forbidden by law irrespective of
abuse.
"The tontine principle thus clearly adds a gambling element
to perfectly legitimate basic life insurance. The 'estimated'
40 The semi-tontine policy is sometimes called the "crap-shooter" policy by its opponents. See Barr, Coupon and Special Contracts, [1961-1962] 2 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF
ACTUARIES IN Punuc PRACTICE 42, 45. It has been bitterly and intemperately attacked by
its opponents. The NALU recently said that "deferred dividends ... are not essential to
and, in fact, are foreign to the basic life insurance operation, being used only to promote
sales by tontine devices that promise highly attractive awards to a relatively few survivors
at the expense of the many who cooperated in a risk adventure superimposed on their
policies without relation either to the financial needs or policy of the company or to the
general interest of all policyholders." National Underwriter, Life Ed., Sept. 9, 1955, pp. 1,
16, col. 4. Prior to the tum of the century Jacob L. Greene, President of Connecticut
Mutual Life, the most dedicated opponent of the tontine in its early days, said: "I believe that the Tontine feature is a complete perversion of the element of protection to the
family which is the sole merit of life insurance and the only reason of its being ••.."
Papers Relating to Tontine Insurance, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., No. 8, p.
3 (1887) as quoted in 1 BuLEY, op. cit. supra note 32, at 103. See generally the polemics
connected with this controversy, to be found in, e.g., the cited collection and in works
cited in STAL.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, notes to Ch. XXI. Stalson gives a summary of the
arguments on both sides. Id. at 487-95.
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jackpot becomes the glittering bait dangled before the prospect
as an extra added inducement, and in the deceptive and misleading estimates of the profits that are to make up the jackpot
and of the termination rates that are to "sweeten" the share
of each surviving policyholder therein, lie our legitimate objections and the hazard that threatens the good name of life
insurance." 50
Let us look more closely at the nature of the tontine portion of
the contract. It has a certain resemblance to a pure endowment.
A person who does not need to insure himself against premature
death, for whatever reason, but who does need to insure himself
against too long life, might wish to procure a pure endowment
policy which pays him only if he survives to the crucial date, or an
annuity which terminates in any event upon his death. If his endowment is combined with a life insurance feature, or if his annuity is
for a number of payments certain, he will pay more than for a pure
endowment or life annuity. The differences in these premiums are
easily calculable on familiar assumptions as to interest rates and
mortality, and are often very striking. It is difficult to see why any
person who needs either a pure endowment or a life annuity, alone
or in combination with life insurance, should be denied one based
upon assumed grounds of public policy and the assertion that
these are gambling contracts. It is difficult to see how the tontine is
in any different position if one assumes that no abuses accompany
its issuance. The purchaser of a tontine has in practical effect
obtained, in combination with his life insurance, a pure endowment in a participating mutual association. The exact amount he
will receive depends on the experience of his class, but he will get
protection of a certain nature which may be useful to him, and at
a relatively low rate. If no abuses accompany the tontine policy, it
seems not only innocuous, but may even be valuable under certain
circumstances. In any case, there is no justification for prohibiting
it because of its essential characteristics. A good deal of the polemic
against the tontine misses the mark.
The semi-tontine may be less innocuous. From one point of
view, it is less speculative than the full tontine. Thus there is a
forfeiture only of the policyholder's share of the deferred dividends, and not of the reserve as well. But the theoretical justification of the tontine is that, like a pure endowment, it provides a
liO Walker, Those Tontines Are Back Again!, Life A. News, Sept. 1954, p. 54. (Emphasis
added.)
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large potential benefit for a low premium. This is especially true if
the ordinary insurance benefit purchased represents only a small
part of the total premium. The semi-tontine does that to a
lesser extent. It is a hybrid contract, mainly ordinary insurance
but partially a pure endowment. Basically it is traditional life insurance to appeal to the sober family man, yet it has a minor
speculative element to appeal to the gambling instinct. It has less
of the advantage of providing a cheap way to create a fund for old
age than does the full tontine. Instead it is a high cost policy with
certain added speculative possibilities to make it appealing. Of
course, it, too, may well enough meet the needs of a small part of
the insuring population, but that was not the intention of its developers. It was intended both in the nineteenth century and more
recently to appeal to a wide range of insurance buyers. No effort
is made to limit its sale to those people who may have some special need for which it is well adapted. Its attraction is not its
suitability for a special purpose, but rather its speculative nature.
It seems to follow that the semi-tontine is more objectionable than
the full tontine, primarily because it serves a useful purpose less
frequently than does the full tontine. While the existence of a
tontine element is not necessarily bad in a contract, and may even
be useful, this combination of the tontine element with life insurance prevents either from performing adequately the task for
which each is the suitable instrument. However, little more can be
said in condemnation of even the semi-tontine, so far as speculative
character is concerned, than that it has relatively little value in
the market place. It can hardly be castigated as a "gambling" contract without a gross distortion of the facts. It is not a bad contract,
but rather a relatively useless contract.

2. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation
The second objection to the tontine is its susceptibility to
misrepresentation. Attention was focused on this problem by an
editorial comment appearing in the National Underwriter.
"At the NALU meeting in Boston the objections made to the
tontine contract were principally the way in which it is usually
sold. It was contended that the tontine policy is almost invariably misrepresented. " 51
The assertion that the tontine is almost invariably misrepresented cannot be accepted without further inquiry. But if it is
51

See note 44 supra.
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true, then it follows without argument that steps should be taken to
control the misrepresentation, for good faith is even more necessary
in insurance than it is in most commercial transactions. If a policyholder learns that he will receive only a small part of his expectations in a tontine policy, "he will believe that he has been overcharged and cheated on every other policy he owns. He very likely
will look upon all other life insurance as legalized robbery." 52 If
the public should develop a dislike and distrust for the institution
of life insurance, it would perform its important role in our social
life less adequately.
When one looks at the tontine policy as actually used in this
country, it becomes apparent why it is especially susceptible to
misrepresentation. It is a hybrid. It is neither pure insurance nor
pure endowment, but a combination of both, designed to couple
the life insurance that most people need with the speculative element that makes it attractive. The buyer considers that he is getting
insurance, the need for which brought him into the market-the
need to protect his family against the consequences of a premature
death. The tontine policy is an expensive way to do this because the
tontine aspect provides protection against excessive duration of life.
Only an unusual agent, perceptive and honest and able successfully
to communicate difficult concepts to ordinary people, could sell the
tontine policy as it exists in the market and be sure that only those
persons who need and want it will acquire it. Even if the semi-tontine as well as the full tontine justifies its existence by providing an
answer to certain special needs, it seems clear that there inevitably
must be much misrepresentation in the sale of such policies.
The tontine is especially susceptible to misrepresentation for
three related reasons, all operating to a degree that makes misrepresentation substantially more likely than in the case of a more
conservative type of life insurance policy. The first is that to the
usual uncertainties of interest earnings, mortality experience, and
actual expense is added still another that is even less predictable,
the lapse rate.
A first-year lapse rate of fifteen to seventeen percent, which
would be quite normal, may easily be stated in such a way as to
suggest an equally large annual lapse rate throughout the life of
a group of policies, which would be highly unlikely. One opponent
of tontine policies made this point in the following language:
"In many cases, an actual first-year termination rate of, say,
52

Walker, supra note 50, at 60.
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17% may be cited to a prospect as the rate that very likely will
be experienced during the entire tontine period specified in
the policy being offered to him. However, if we assume that
in a class of 1,000 policyholders, 17% of them will terminate
each year for 19 years, then we will find that only 23 will share
in the tontine distribution. Such a termination assumption
has no factual basis in the known experience of any company."5s
Since a heavy termination rate means a gain for the survivors,
there is much temptation for the agent to exaggerate.54 Inasmuch
as lapse means forfeiture and persistency results in a sharing in
profits from lapses, there is a tendency for tontine policyholders to
show a higher persistency rate than ordinary policyholders.' At
least the argument has been made in favor of tontines at a meeting
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that they
encourage persistency. 55 Surely it is deceptive to emphasize to a
prospect that he will have the advantages of a high rate of termination if the tontine encourages a high rate of persistency. There is a
misleading appeal to the perpetual optimism in human natureto the assumption by each person that he will be one of the fortunate few and to assumed facts about lapses that are likely to be
untrue.
The second reason for the susceptibility of the tontine to misrepresentation is that the lack of the same degree of legal control
over the deferred dividend funds as that which exists over the
legal reserve makes it possible to use overconfident assumptions in
predicting future developments. While the reserve must be computed on the basis of conservative assumptions, no such requirements are even relevant for deferred dividends. The salesman is
free to estimate the profits on deferred dividends on the basis of
the most favorable dividend and market price history, using a
period such as 1919-1938, for example.56 Moreover, it is easy to set
up a profitable investment list on the basis of hindsight. The possibilities for misrepresentation seem clear enough, leading in
extreme cases to what one opponent called a "fantastic" profit proId. at 60.
Id. at 54.
55 Memorandum submitted by Herbert Graves and D. D. Murphy. See [1955] I
PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 119.
56 The proposal reproduced in Walker, supra note 50, at 55, assumes "a repetition of
the dividend and market price history, 1919-1938, of the Special Contingency Fund Portfolio of earning securities in each of the following 30 Basic Industries." (There follows a
list of thirty leading corporations.)
53
Iii
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jection.57 The extremes to which such exaggeration may go are
found in a sales presentation that proclaimed, for a Twenty Pay
Life Policy with a semi-tontine feature, that
"based on a minimum of $26.00 per unit of $5,000 being annually contributed to the reserve fund as provided for in the
special resolution by the board of directors, in twenty years
your share of this distribution of profit would be a cash settlement of $5,137.15." 58
The above proposal assumes that a $26 annual allocation to the
tontine fund, or $520 in all, will mushroom to $5,137 ·within
twenty years. The sales interview even suggested that this was
ultraconservative. A staff member of the Kentucky Insurance Department is said to have estimated, however, on the basis of the
first five years of experience with this fund, that it would in fact
be worth between $700 and $900 to those who survived and did
not lapse.59 It must be pointed out, however, that the first five
years would not necessarily be representative, and that the ultimate results might possibly be better.
A former president of the National Association of Life Underwriters, a vigorous opponent of the tontine, provides another illustration. 60 He focused upon a Twenty Pay Life Policy for $5,000.
At age ten the annual premium was $165.65. After twenty years,
the total of premiums paid would be $3,313, at which time the
guaranteed cash value would be $1,770. The estimated value
of annual cash dividends left with the company was stated at
$331.30, and the estimated value of the tontine fund dividend was
$8,656.16. The total, $10,757.46, was 324 percent of the total
premium paid and more than twice the face of the policy.
He then compared this with a $5,000 Twenty Pay Life, Endowment at age eighty-five, without a tontine feature. As sold
by a "representative nonparticipating company" the latter policy
cost $105.15 annually at age ten, and had a cash value of $1,775
at the end of the twentieth year.
"It is abundantly clear that the company issuing the semitontine policy is putting no more into reserves and guaranteed
non-forfeiture values despite the fact that it collects $1,210.00
more in premiums over 20 years to maturity." 61
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 60.
Horan, Gimmick Policies, Best's Life News, June 1962, p. 65.
Id. at 66.
Walker, supra note 50, at 55, 58.
Id. at 58, 60.
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For the reasons discussed above, the excessive charge is not theoretically objectionable if it all goes into the tontine fund. However,
in no tontine policy or proposal that the NALU president examined did the "issuing company propose to set aside in the tontine
fund as much as one-half of the excess of the larger premium
charged over the full tontine period." 62 The confident projections
seem to contemplate such a total allocation, however. If in fact
substantial sums are diverted from the premiums to some purposes
other than those stated to the policyholder, it would not be surprising if "the actual results fell so very far short of the rosy picture
of dividend bonuses painted for policyholders that many of them
actually felt they had been swindled." 63
The third reason that the tontine is often misrepresented is
that there is little that can be done by the law to ensure that the
entire excess is actually allocated to the fund. These extra dollars
are largely in the control of the board of directors, and the policyholders have no precise contractual rights. In the heyday of the
tontine, this was the great vice; funds for which there was such
limited accountability were subject to extravagant practices and
graft. There is no way to reach valid conclusions about the extent
to which wasteful practices exist today, but there is at least some
evidence that they are not unknown. Indeed, it would be surprising if there were not substantial abuses.
3. Danger of Venality

Extravagance and graft are themselves objectionable, quite
aside from the fact that they lead to misrepresentation. Indeed,
they led to the abolition of the tontine policy in many states in the
early twentieth century.
When a life insurance company operating on the legal reserve
basis makes a promise to pay a specified sum of money upon the
death of the policyholder, it is required by law to maintain reserves
which are adequate as computed on a sound actuarial basis, to provide the funds with which to pay the beneficiary when the death
occurs. The tontine aspect of the policy is different, however. No
specified sum must be paid. There is only the promise that the
policyholder will share in the proceeds of a fund the exact amount
of which is completely uncertain, made at a time when it is even
uncertain how much money will be paid into it year by year. The
62 Id. at 60.
OS United States Rev., June
PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 117, 118.

12, 1954 (editorial comment), reproduced in (1955) 1
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deferment of dividends that is involved in the sale of the tontine
leads to the acquisition by the insurance company of large sums
of money for which there is only limited accountability. The absence of close legal control over the funds encourages misuse
through wasteful expenditures and through outright graft and
corruption. Both kinds of misuse occurred in the latter part of
the nineteenth century, eventually leading to the Armstrong investigation. For one thing, the large sums of money held in deferred
dividend accounts encouraged companies to engage in a commission war in which the rates of commission for agents continually
grew as the companies tried to outbid each other for the better
salesmen. Commissions tended to become uneconomically high,
leading in turn to rebating and its discriminatory consequences.
Second, the large sums of money available without strict legal
accountability encouraged the payment of unjustifiably high salaries and the use of other company funds to "buy" legislators and
to make other improper and corrupt expenditures. 64 A repetition
of the more extreme forms of these abuses of the Gilded Age seems
unlikely. But there is no assurance that some such practices would
not be resumed. Even today dishonesty in public and business life,
while less prevalent, is by no means unknown.
This lack of accountability is not necessarily inherent in the
tontine. Joseph B. Maclean, actuary of the Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York, neatly put it:
"The main defect of the system as formerly practiced was
not inherent but arose from the fact that no accounting was
required of the funds which were being accumulated to pay
deferred dividends. . . . [Thus] it was the lack of proper accounting which was wrong, rather than any fundamental defect of the system itself." 65
The graft and corruption which were associated with the tontine prior to the Armstrong investigation resulted from inadequate
laws, not from the nature of the tontine. However, there is little
likelihood that a satisfactory regulatory system for tontine policies
will be developed, since they are now, and probably will remain,
a minor aspect of the life insurance market.
64 1 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 193-244 (1953); JAMES, THE ME'Ill.OPOUTAN LIFE 139-65 (1947); 1 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 140-68 (1951). See generally
.ARMSTRONG COMMITTEE REcoRD: TESTIMONY, EXHIBITS, REPORT (1905). A good contem•
porary muckraking account was HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1907).
65 MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 166 (9th ed. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
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B. Asserted Justifications for the Tontine
In defense of the semi-tontine policy, it is sometimes urged that
the deferred dividend is nothing more than a terminal or surrender
dividend of the type that is regularly issued by many large companies. 66 A surrender dividend represents a contribution to surplus
out of premium to ensure the solidity of the operation. It is returned to the policyholder upon termination in order to produce
as much equity as possible among the policyholders. The terminal
dividend recognizes that surplus arises out of policyholder contributions and should be shared as evenly as possible. 67 This is in
a sense the converse of the deferred dividend idea, where the terminating policies forfeit all their interest in the deferred dividend
fund. 68 Another suggested justification for the semi-tontine is that
many large companies got a start by issuing it in the late nineteenth
century. 00 There is much truth here, but it is a non sequitur to
conclude that the semi-tontine should therefore be legal. Many a
large and now respectable family fortune had its origin in acts of
corruption and exploitation; many a great and now respectable
company was in its origin little more than organized brigandage.
But at least in some respects the moral level of our society has
improved, and the fact that some reputable companies have a
blemished past does not justify new companies in similar reprehensible practices. What was yesterday only morally wrong may
today also be illegal; if it is not yet illegal, perhaps it should become so.
It is urged as a related argument that the past use of specialty
policies by companies which are now large was a competitive necessity, and that a similar practice by small companies is today also a
competitive necessity. 70 It is some answer to that assertion that many
companies, both large and small, seem to get along without this
use. Of course, considerable value is properly placed in our society
on free access to the market by new entrepreneurs. But short of
imperative necessity, access should be upon terms now regarded as
the basis for moral and legitimate operation of the enterprise.
Maclean pointed out other advantages to the tontine. He sug66 See, e.g., National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 5, 1955, p. 3, col. 1, and Sept. 30,
1955, p. 12, col. I.
67 Surrender dividends are explained in McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 303-05 (1959). See
also MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 167-68.
68 National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 5, 1955, p. 3., col. I.
60 Id., Jan. 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 4.
70 Memorandum submitted to the Laws and Legislation Committee of the NAIC
by Herbert Graves and D. D. Murphy. [1955] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 119.
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gested that a year might be too short a period for a company to
ascertain its profits and losses in a business heavily dependent upon
the maintenance of reliable and predictable results over long
periods.71 However, in Maclean's own analysis this is not crucial:
"The amount to be distributed as dividends in any year will
not necessarily or usually be the actual surplus earnings of
the previous year. When current surplus earnings are not
sufficient to maintain the scale of dividends, they may be
supplemented by drawing on the existing surplus. In the same
way, when surplus earnings are more than sufficient to maintain the existing scale, part of the current year's earnings may
be added to surplus. When fluctuation in surplus earnings
are small, this is a practical system of avoiding frequent small
changes in the dividend scale.... " 72
Maclean also suggests as an advantage of the deferred dividend system, the reduction of the strain on surplus caused by paying dividends in the early policy years before any surplus had been created. 78
In summary, the tontine does not seem to be inherently evil as
a gambling contract, but it does seem to be especially susceptible
to misrepresentation and, absent the development of some new
regulatory patterns, there is serious danger of misuse of the funds
for which there is only limited accountability. There is substantial
justification for control.

C. Methods of Control of the Tontine
The disadvantages in the issuance of the tontine policy are
serious and require steps to combat them. Restriction of the tontine to its proper sphere is one possibility. This would require, on
the one hand, the development of a new set of legal controls to
prevent the misuse of the funds held for deferred dividends and,
on the other, the effective prevention of misrepresentation. The
most obvious step to take to curb misrepresentation is to proscribe
it and prosecute violators. But misrepresentation is a difficult offense to detect and to prove, and consumer protection through the
processes of the criminal law is at best a weak reed. 74 More effective
devices seem necessary if it is important to stop the misrepresentation.
71 MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 166.
Id. at 149-50 (8th ed. 1957).
Id. at 166 (9th ed. 1962).
On this subject, see Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing,
61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 141 (1961).
12
78
74
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Prohibition of the tontine would be the most certain means of
overcoming the disadvantages it offers. This has indeed been the
normal approach to the tontine whenever there has been an attempt at legal control. However, prohibition raises a serious problem of regulatory policy. Freedom of contract is an important value
in our legal system. 75 It rests upon the assumption that no government agency is wise enough to make all contractual decisions for
the population-to pass judgment on the social value of all transactions. This is wise as a general policy, and particularly if the
contract in question offers real advantages of which the public
would otherwise be deprived.
In this case, however, most of the advantages can be obtained
by the buyer without using the objectionable contract, by combining, in any proportion the buyer desires or needs, term or ordinary
insurance with annuities or endowment insurance. Only if the
buyer wants a "pure endowment" might there be a gap in the
market, for such a contract is seldom sold. It is revealing that
McGill thinks the reason for the absence of the pure endowment
from the market is that "few individuals are willing to take the
chance of . . . forfeiting the entire consideration paid for the contract. "76 Yet a great many find attractions in the tontine policy,
which provides part of the same element. It is not possible to say
that there would be no loss whatever to the market if the tontine
were prohibited, but it seems clear that the loss would not be very
great.
Though a clear case must be made for the prohibition of any
contract, the opponents of the tontine seem to have made a persuasive case for its abolition, and to have discharged the burden of
proof. The tontine has serious defects, and it makes relatively little
contribution to the market. To prohibit it seems justified if the
dangers it presents cannot be eliminated with facility in any other
way.
Controls for the tontine other than outright prohibition would
be difficult to devise. Although it is not now likely, it is possible
for the deferred dividend fund to be subjected to legal control as
stringent as that applicable to reserve funds. However, the main
danger of the tontine is not that it facilitates misuse of funds, but
that it often is the subject of serious misrepresentation. There are
already sweeping laws on the books directed against misrepresenta75 See Kimball, supra note 25.
76 McGILL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 70.
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tion by agents. Perhaps a statute which would compel all statements
made respecting anticipated dividends to be in writing would go
some distance toward the solution of the misrepresentation problem, if it were rigorously enforced. The prohibition of certain representations might help. An Illinois regulation, for example, prohibits any statement that a company makes a profit as a result of
policy lapses or surrenders. 77 However, in the end these techniques
of control probably would founder on the same difficulties that
generally afflict regulation of misrepresentation. Inadequacy of staff,
the difficulty of obtaining testimony, and the lack of official awareness of violation except in a very small percentage of the cases, all
combine to make the problem almost insoluble. It seems to follow
that the tontine can be controlled effectively only by prohibition.
If it is bad enough it should be prohibited. If it is not bad enough
to prohibit, then of course it should be controlled so far as is possible, but there should be recognition from the outset that success
is likely to be meager.
Freedom of competition or of access to the market is also a
value in a democratic society. But this is not a value that justifies
access to the market at the expense of accepted moral standards of
the community relating to business practice. It is not an argument
that should lead us to refrain from prohibition.
It follows from the arguments presented here that the tontine
in all its variants should be prohibited. Statutes that require an
annual apportionment and distribution of dividends seem to meet
this need. Apportionment alone may be enough if there is no forfeiture on lapse or death thereafter.
A tontine-like element sometimes shows up in other contracts
such as the charter policy, which is considered next. However, a
minor and fortuitous "tontine" element in a contract is not alone
enough to condemn it, for the dangers of the tontine lie not in its
nature but in its abuse. Consequently there should be prohibition
only where the danger of abuse is substantial. Only when the tontine element is significant and tends to encourage misrepresentation or misuse of funds should it be abolished by legal fiat.
V.

PROFIT-SHARING AND CHARTER POLICIES

All mutual insurance companies, and many stock companies,
issue participating policies which promise to the policyholders a
share in the surplus (sometimes miscalled profits) generated by the
77

Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 5(22), Oct. 31, 1962.
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participating business. The company apportions to each policyholder as a dividend, usually annually, that part of the divisible
surplus that arises from the participating business, to the extent
that it was contributed by him. In short, the dividend is essentially
a return, calculated as equitably as possible, of the amount the
company charged the policyholder in excess of the real cost of his
insurance. A profit-sharing policy goes a step farther than a participating policy in providing for participation in "profits" beyond the excess sum contributed by the profit-sharing policyholder
himself. For example, it may contain a clause providing that the
policy "will share in the profits of the Company to the extent apportioned to it by the Company." 78 This vague language does not
limit the distribution to the surplus produced by the profit-sharing
business. The company may contemplate inclusion of at least a
portion of the surplus from the nonparticipating business as well.
In the example given here, the promise is not explicit and the
policyholder may have no clearly defined enforceable legal rights.
This is one of the objections which can be made to some profitsharing policies although it is not necessarily inherent in this type
of policy.79

A. 0 bjections to Profit-Sharing Policies
There are two main objections, other than indefiniteness, to
the profit-sharing feature. First, its opponents argue that it is
particularly susceptible to misrepresentation. Second, they urge
that it violates universal explicit statutory prohibitions of discrimination between policyholders of the same age and characteristics.
I. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation
Any insurance policy is subject to possible misrepresentation,
but many persons have urged that the profit-sharing feature is
especially susceptible, and even that the use of the term is itself
misleading. For example, the Florida Insurance Department has
said that "the words profit sharing on a policy are misleading
78 This is an exact quotation from a policy in our files. Later policies issued by the
same company used the word "surplus" in place of the word "profits."
70 For example, another company's profit-sharing policy was much more specific in
setting out policyholders' rights. It provided that "the company guarantees that, during
any year in which Planned Expansion Policies are in force with premiums payable in the
amount of $100,000.00 or more, no dividends will be paid to stockholders of the Company
unless dividends are paid on Planned Expansion Profit Sharing policies in a total amount
equal to IO% of one year's premium paid on such dividends during such year, or 10%
of dividends paid to stockholders in such year, whichever amount is greater." Prospectus
of National Western Life Ins. Co., Jan. 9, 1963, p. 12.
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to the public, and lend themselves to misrepresentation." 80 The
first part of the Florida statement is not necessarily true. The policy
may actually be a profit-sharing contract, in which case there is
nothing misleading about the appellation. Of course, if profit-sharing is promised but not provided there is deception, but that
results not from the use of the words for an appropriate situation
but from their misuse in an inappropriate situation. Any words
can be misused in this way. In the discussion that follows, it is
assumed that the policy is in fact a profit-sharing policy, and it is
asked whether the profit-sharing aspect of the policy lends itself
especially to distortion of the information which an agent normally
provides a policyholder.
Companies selling specialty policies frequently prepare
"canned" sales presentations, expecting that they will be memorized by their agents and used verbatim. One such presentation
instructs the agent to ask the prospect:
"If you were to invest $400.00 or any amount, with complete
safety, and with no time or effort on your part, what would you
consider a fair rate of return on your money?"

The agent then is instructed to await an answer. It is anticipated
that the reply will range from four to six percent. Upon receiving
an answer, the agent is instructed to say:
"Four to six percent would be excellent and of course would
also be taxable .... The growth (of our company) ... has been
phenomenal .... This was so far beyond the expectation of
our board of directors that they declared ... a surplus sharing
bonus which amounted to 12.4 percent return and that was
tax free." 81
The purpose of these statements is to characterize the policy as an
extraordinary investment because of the profit-sharing feature,
while the attractiveness is further enhanced by the assertion of
freedom from taxation.
If the surplus sharing bonus is in fact a sharing of profits derived
from other classes of policyholders, then it is a good return on the
policyholder's investment. The first possibility for deception is, however, that most of the return to the policyholder may be in the nature
of an ordinary participating dividend rather than a share of profit.
80 Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 22, Aug. 8, 1961, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER,
(1961] INs. DEP'T SERVICE [for] FLORIDA 15.
81 These quotations are copied exactly from a sales presentation in our files. The pre•
mium in this instance was $410.40, and the dividend was $50.90, or 12.4%.
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In one such case, the return is alleged to have consisted in large part
of (I) a refund of an excess mortality charge of about sixty-five percent of the expected mortality cost, (2) a refund of about twenty
percent of the loading, and (3) an interest credit of approximately
one percent of the policy reserve at the beginning of the year. 82
Thus, all of the surplus bonus was simply a refund of overcharge,
i.e., it was an ordinary participating dividend and did not represent
profits at all. 83 It is possible that there may be companies issuing
profit-sharing policies and allocating profits to the profit-sharing
policyholders in an amount as substantial as twelve to fifteen percent. This would depend upon considerable success of the company
in selling nonparticipating policies or policies that participate only
after a certain sum has been allocated to the benefit of profit-sharing
policyholders. We do not assert that no company ever plays fair
with its profit-sharing policyholders, but rather that deception is so
easy and profitable that it need not even be intended. The above
statement that 12.4 percent of the policyholder's investment, i.e., of
the initial premium, was returned to him during the preceding year
could be (I) a statement that the profits allocated to the profit-sharing policyholders amounted to a 12.4 percent return on their premiums, which would make it a profitable investment, or (2) an
assertion that 12.4 percent of the premium was returned as a participating dividend, or (3) any intermediate combination of the
two. Since these policies are participating policies, it is almost
certain that in all cases some portion-perhaps a very substantial
portion-of the return to the policyholders represents a participating dividend rather than profits in the true sense. 84 It would be
a rare agent who would not describe the facts in the way most
advantageous to his company and to himself. The probability of
misrepresentation and misunderstanding in the case of the profitsharing policy is extremely high. Returns to the policyholder that
82 Reply Brief for Wis. Ass'n of Life Underwriters and Wis. Life Convention, pp. 25-26,
for Hearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08 (Jan. 1962). This
assertion does not appear to have been denied by the company in the documents filed
with the Wisconsin Department of Insurance.
83 Reply Brief for G. L. Ins. Co., at 13, in the hearing mentioned in note 82 supra.
84 One company recently issued a "President's expansion plan" which was a Twenty
Payment Life Plan containing coupons and "special participation" features. This is a
charter policy within our definition. When the company announced a dividend of about
10% to its policyholders, the chairman of the board said: "This is indicative of the success
of this life insurance policy with its special investment feature ...•" But for the year the
dividend was declared the company had an operating loss of over $100,000. The 10%
dividend can hardly have been a profit at all; instead it must have been a return of
premiums. See BEST'S LIFE INSURANCE REPo&TS 2023-24 (1962 ed.); Insurance Advocate,
Nov. 3, 1962, p. 70.
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are in reality returns of premium paid are made to appear to be
returns on the premium, i.e., profits.85 The emphasis on investment
and a high rate of return tends to mislead the purchaser into
believing that he is acquiring primarily an investment rather than
a life insurance policy. The market success of some life insurance
stocks prepares the way for even more striking deceptions, and
some sales presentations are so successful that they convince the
purchaser that he is acquiring stock in the company.86
Although it is by no means impossible that a transaction will
satisfy the expectations of the profit-sharing policyholder, as one
would expect from the distortion in the typical sales presentation,
"experience ... [has] indicated that purchasers of such contracts
were more often than not disappointed." 87
Two characteristics of the business lead to the almost inevitable
disappointment of the profit-sharing policyholders. The first results
from the competitive position of nonparticipating policies. Agents
selling participating policies are able to emphasize in their sales
talks that gross premiums less dividends will produce a lower net
cost than in nonparticipating policies despite an initially higher
premium. 88 In order to remain competitive, nonparticipating premiums must be kept as low as possible. Thus, price competition
limits drastically the nonparticipating surplus available for distribution to profit-sharing policyholders.
The second characteristic of the business that lessens the possibility of the profit-sharing policyholder reaping "tremendous
profits" is that ultimate control of the conduct of the business lies,
not with the profit-sharing policyholders, but with the stockholders
and with a management representing them. A stock insurance com85 The Wisconsin Insurance Department issued Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code on May 4, 1962, which said, in describing the profit-sharing policy,
that "such policy forms are so drafted that it appears to a prospective policyholder that
he is purchasing a preferential share of the future profit and earnings of the insurance
corporation rather than purchasing a life insurance policy which may be subject to refund
of excess premium payments."
86 "[F]or every dollar this company ever earns, you as a . . . [profit-sharing policyholder] will get a piece of that dollar." (From a sales presentation in our files.) The
Indiana Insurance Commissioner stated, in a circular dated June 3, 1959, that "other data
[used in sales presentations] indicates how insurance stocks have grown in market value,
leaving the inference that if the prospect buys one of these 'profit sharing' contracts, he
too is in for making a fortune-the 'chance of a lifetime' they are told. The prospect
is again being misled."
87 Statement of California Insurance Commissioner, J. of Commerce, March 7, 1960,
p. 9, col. I.
88 Three-fourths of all ordinary life insurance in force in the United States is participating insurance, attesting the success of this approach. Beith, Participating Life
Insurance-The Stock Company Version, 29 J. INS. 229, 231 (1962).
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pany is not an eleemosynary institution, but rather it exists to earn
money for the stockholders. If discretion is left to each company
to decide how much to allocate to profit-sharing policyholders,
there is no reason to assume that the board of directors will be any
more generous than appears to be necessary. Even if the profitsharing policyholders have more precisely defined rights than in
our original example, 89 the extent to which there are profits to be
divided may be subject to some control by the way in which the
business is operated. The amount may be reduced by selling one
kind of policy rather than another, and there is every reason to
expect management to take such considerations into account in
its management practices.
Indeed, when contractual rights permit, it is not unknown for
the stockholders, through the management, to make an effort to
claim even a portion of the profits generated by the participating
business. This is suggested by the existence in five states of statutes
or regulations placing ceilings on the amount of profits that stockholders may take from the participating business. Illinois requires
that at least ninety percent of the profits on participating business
be allocated to the benefit of the participating policyholders. 90 Wisconsin and New York permit the company to distribute to its
stockholders the larger of two amounts, (a) ten percent of the
profits on participating policies, and (b) fifty cents per year per
thousand dollars of participating life insurance.91 New Jersey uses
the fifty cents per year per thousand limitation.92 Nebraska is the
most restrictive of all the states; it requires that all surplus generated by the participating business accrue to the benefit of the
participating policyholders.93
79 supra and accompanying text.
life company authorized to do business in this State shall issue both participating and non-participating policies unless at least ninety per centum of the profits
on its participating policies shall inure to the benefit of the participating policyholders."
ILL. INS, CODE § 233 (1961).
91 " ••• no profits on participating policies and contracts in excess of the larger of
(a) IO per cent of such profits, or (b) fifty cents per year per thousand dollars of participating life insurance . . . in force at the end of the year, shall inure to the benefit
of the stockholders .••. " N.Y. INs. CODE § 216(6)(b). WIS. ADM. CoDE section Ins. 2.02(4)(a)
(1962) sets out similar limitations.
92 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:34-12 (1962).
113 "All domestic stock life insurance companies, which shall hereafter issue both participating and nonparticipating policies, shall hold all the surplus and earnings arising
from the participating insurance for the benefit of and for distribution to the participating policyholders •••." NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-708 (1960). In Canada, a sliding scale applies. The stockholders' participation is limited to 10% of profits when the profit fund
does not exceed $250 million, to 7½% between $250 and $500 million, to 5% from
$500 million to $1 billion, and 2½% above $1 billion. The Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT., c. 31, § 84 (1952).
89 See note
90 " ••• no
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2. Violation of Statutory Prohibitions Against Discrimination
The second principal objection to the profit-sharing policy is
that it violates explicit statutory prohibitions, most of them being
concerned with discrimination. Section 3(£) of the Uniform Unfair Trade Practices Act94 makes it an unfair trade practice to
"issue . . . stock . . . or securities or any special or advisory
board or other contracts of any kind promising returns and
profits as an inducement to insurance ...."
Section 3 (g) makes it an unfair practice to
"make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of
individuals between those of the same class and equal expectation of life in the rates charged for contracts of insurance
or of life annuity or in the dividends or other benefits payable
thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of the
contracts it makes ... [or to] discriminate unfairly between
other risks involving essentially the same hazards and expense
elements or between risks in the application of like rates and
credits."
Section 3(h)(l) prohibits rebates or
"any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not
specified in the policy contract of insurance."
However, section 3(h)(2) states that
"Nothing in this or the preceding subsection [the anti-discrimination and rebate provisions] shall be so construed as to
prohibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance
from paying bonuses to policyholders or otherwise abating
their premiums in whole or in part out of surplus accumulated
from non-participating insurance .... "
94 Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Under•
writers Ass'n, insurance was deemed to be commerce. Consequently it would be within

the scope of federal control under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958) and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958). Congress then enacted Public Law 15 (FergusonMcCarran Act), 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958), which preserved the
rights of the states to regulate insurance with the proviso that "after June 30, 1948 the
Sherman Act, .•. the Clayton Act . . . [and] the Federal Trade Commission Act shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by state law." Prompted by the last phrase, in order to preserve state control, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners undertook studies which culminated in the Model
Unfair Trade Practices Act. For reports, proposals, and other information, see PROCEEDINGS
OF N.A.I.C. passim (1947). For proposed bills, see id. at 392-410; 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE
199-254 (5th ed. 1952). See also Kimball & Jackson, supra note 74, at 143-44 (1961). All the
states have in substance enacted this model act. [1960] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 150.

1963]

SPECIALTY POLICIES

207

As enacted in some states, for example in New Jersey, the last
quoted subsection has contained an important added qualification:

"[P]rovided, that any such bonuses or abatement of premiums
shall be fair and equitable to policyholders and for the best
interests of the company and its policyholders ...." 911
The limiting provision in section 3(h)(2) does not apply to section
3(£); its range of application is explicitly limited to sections 3(g)
and 3(h)(l).
Our basic problem is whether profit-sharing policies are legal
or whether they are forbidden by the statutes quoted above. There
are two separate questions. The first is whether section 3(h)(2)
precludes the application of section 3(g), which in the absence of
section 3(h)(2) would surely prohibit profit-sharing policies as discriminatory. The second is whether section 3(£), which is unqualified by section 3(h)(2), forbids these policies. We shall consider these two questions separately.
First, does section 3(h)(2) preclude the application of section
3(g)? Read literally, it seems to authorize the payment of bonuses
out of the surplus from nonparticipating business without any special limitation of the way in which the bonus must be allocated; i.e.,
it seems on its face to insulate such bonus payments from any
requirement of equitable and fair allocation. The nature of nonparticipating business tends to strengthen this position. By contract, holders of such policies are excluded altogether from participation in surplus. In the normal case, any surplus produced by
their policies accrues to the benefit of stock.holders. If these stockholders should decide, through management, to make a gift of
some portion of surplus to a special class of policyholders, for any
reason or for no reason, why should nonparticipating policyholders,
who have no claim to share in the surplus anyway, have any ground
for complaint? If anyone should have reason to object, should it
not be the stock.holders whose money is being given away? This is a
plausible argument, especially using a literal interpretation of the
statute.
However, other interpretations are more persuasive, especially
after a consideration of the policy grounds for the enactment of
section 3(h)(2). The Uniform Act, section 3(h)(2), contains two
other situations to which section 3(g) does not apply. 96 One is the
return to industrial policyholders who pay direct to the home office
N.J. STAT• .ANN. § 17:29B-4(8)(b)(i) (1963).
06 I RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 202 n.13.
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that portion of the premium which represents the cost of the doorto-door collection which was formerly usual in industrial policies;
the other is a readjustment of group life premiums based on either
loss or expense experience thereunder. The thrust of all three exceptions to section 3(g) is that in those cases in which policyholders
have been overcharged, it is legitimate to return noncontractual
dividends, thereby offsetting the overcharge. Light may be thrown
on the purpose of the first exception by a look at an incident in
the history of the Prudential Insurance Company. The Prudential
was organized as a stock company, issuing solely nonparticipating
industrial policies; later it added participating ordinary insurance
to its portfolio. At first there were no accurate life tables for use
with industrial policies, and the experimental premiums charged
by the company proved to be excessive. Beginning as early as 1880,
at intervals of five to ten years, the company made the industrial
policies in effect participating, by granting voluntary dividends
or concessions on an ad hoc basis. Management felt that the long
range interests of company and stockholders would be best served
by this action, but dissident stockholders eventually brought a bill
in equity asking for a mandatory injunction to compel the directors
to distribute the profits as dividends to the stockholders. In 1912,
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals upheld the exercise of
discretion by the directors and approved the voluntary concessions
to nonparticipating policyholders. 97
Not only is it possible to argue that the Prudential "concession"
was the kind of bonus contemplated in the drafting of the section,
but the overwhelming importance of equity as a factor in life insurance98 makes it hard to believe that a legislature would consciously approve anything else. We have found no indication that
legislatures contemplated the return of excess nonparticipating
surplus to a group of policyholders who made no contribution to
the surplus; the purpose of the whole of section 3(h)(2) is obviously
to make it possible for a company to deal reasonably with policyholders by returning overcharges, hence, we cannot interpret it as
permitting inequity among classes of policyholders.
The distinction between what the Prudential did and what
profit-sharing policies do seems clear. Prudential, out of caution
made excessive premium charges and ultimately returned the excess. On the other hand, profit-sharing companies know in advance
97
98

Blanchard v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 209, 83 Atl. 220 (1912).
See note 25 supra, and notes 99, 100 infra.
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that their premium charges are redundant, for they are deliberately
made so; the companies propose to give the excess, not to the people
who paid it, but to another favored group. The profit-sharing is held
out as a special inducement to the purchase of insurance by the
latter group at the expense of the former.
The proviso added to section 3(h)(2) in New Jersey and elsewhere strengthens this position by stating that the bonus is permissible "provided, that any such bonuses or abatement of premiums shall be fair and equitable to policyholders ...." This only
makes explicit what is already implicit in the section, and makes
this statute consistent with the substantial emphasis upon equity
throughout the whole of insurance law:
"Equity clearly requires a system of distribution which does
not favor any class of policies at the expense of any other
class .... It is usually considered that, from a theoretical point
of view at least, equity requires a return of surplus to individual policyholders in the proportions in which they have
contributed to it.... [F]rom a practical point of view equity
requires a reasonable recognition of profits and the sources
from which they have arisen." 99
The contribution method of allocation is the expression of equity
in dividend distribution. It takes into account all variables insofar
as they can practicably be ascertained, and contemplates that "each
participant should be benefited in proportion to the excess of his
payments over and above the actual cost of insurance.'' 100 The basic
principle of the contribution plan provides a standard against
which all rules of distribution should be tested for equity.
The Wisconsin statute contains the "fair and equitable" provision.101 Arguing from it, the Wisconsin Insurance Department outlawed profit-sharing policies as an unfair and inequitable allocation
of the surplus available for distribution. 102 This interpretation is
sound, but it is not essential that the "fair and equitable" provision
be found in the statute in order to produce the same result, for
equity is a fundamental part of insurance law without the provis10n.
MACLEAN &: MARSHALL, DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS 13-14 (1937).
11 JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ACTUARIES 122 (1863), as quoted in KRUEGER &:
WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 254 (1953). The contribution method
has received court approval. See Rhine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 1, 6 N.E.2d
74 (1936).
101 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 207.04(l)(i) (1957).
102 See the note attached to Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962).
00
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Of course it can be argued that if legislatures had wanted to
limit the permissible distribution under section 3(h)(2) to nonparticipating policyholders, they could easily have explicitly so
provided. The simple answer to that contention is that the drafting
of statutes in the United States is not an exact science, and the
determination of legislative intent is an inquiry of considerable
complexity. Moreover, the expression "abating their premiums"
is at the heart of section 3(h)(2), and it seems quite reasonable to
conclude that the distribution of surplus to nonparticipating policyholders, even though that was not provided in the contract, was contemplated as the way to abate premiums. It is not clear what else
that expression could mean. We conclude, therefore, that section
3(h)(2) is merely intended to authorize the kind of conduct engaged
in by the Prudential, putting beyond doubt the power of the in•
surance company to deal equitably with its policyholders when it
discovers that its premiums are excessive. Any other result, although arguably consistent with the literal language, would be
inconsistent with the general tenor of American insurance law.
This result is strongly supported by a 1942 Minnesota case. A
group of charter policyholders were entitled to an especially advantageous participation in the profits of the company. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the arrangement violated the
anti-discrimination statutes; the court placed a lien on the charter
policies for the benefit of the noncharter policyholders, to remain
until such time as the excessive payments received by the charter
policyholders were redistributed more equitably to all policyholders.1oa
It can be concluded that profit-sharing policies are in violation
of section 3(g), the anti-discrimination provision of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act, and that section 3(h)(2) does not preclude
the application of section 3(g) to them. If this result is accepted,
it is unnecessary to ask the second question, whether section 3(£)
prohibits profit-sharing policies. It is less clear that it does. Primarily, section 3(£) is directed toward a particular kind of discriminatory conduct-the use of special inducements to the purchase of
the insurance policy. The items discussed in section 3(£) are mainly
separable contracts or documents such as shares of stock, etc., which
are offered as an inducement. It is tempting to simplify the interpretation of the section by limiting its application to separate inducements, but this may not be completely sound. There is some
103

See Lommen v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 577, 4 N.W.2d 639 (1942).
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basis for the argument, which is discussed later, that the charter
policy is a new guise in which the separate advisory board contract
is likely to reappear, and that the subterfuge of combining this
special benefit with the policy should not succeed, hence section
3(£) should also be applicable to prevent at least the charter policy
form of profit sharing.
B. The Nature of Charter Policies
Charter polices are issued at the beginning of a company's operation, and give the charter policyholder a special advantage over
later policyholders. Although the special advantage can be almost
anything, usually it is profit sharing. Such policies constitute a
special class of profit-sharing policies, characterized by issuance on
a limited basis, and for this reason it is natural to deal with them
here.
The charter policy is issued with an assurance that it will be
sold only to a limited and predetermined number of persons, or
up to a limited and predetermined total dollar amount. Thus, a
restricted group of people is promised participation in the longrange earnings of the company, usually arising both from the surplus on the business of the charter group and from all other
business ·written by the company, whether participating or nonparticipating.
The charter policy is subject to essentially the same criticisms as
the profit-sharing policy. Susceptibility to misrepresentation is the
first major objection to both, but here a special likelihood of misrepresentation is said to result from the presence of a tontine element. The second major objection, as with profit-sharing policies
generally, is alleged violation of nondiscrimination statutes; there
are some special considerations which must take us somewhat beyond the earlier discussion.
l. The Tontine Element-Misrepresentation

By limiting in advance the number of policies which will be
sold, usually to the early purchasers of insurance in the company,
the charter policy creates a closed group. As the policies in the
group terminate, either by death or by surrender, the size of the
group decreases. Since the charter policyholders have been promised a share in the profits generated by policyholders other than
those in the group, if the total amount to be distributed is not subject to the discretion of the board of directors, but depends solely
on the company's success, then the share of the policyholder might
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well increase in the same way that an increase occurs in the tontine
policy. This effect is what we call the "tontine element." We have
already seen that statutes or insurance department rulings in most
states seek to eliminate tontine policies, primarily by requiring an
annual (or sometimes less frequent) distribution of surplus arising
from the participating business.104 This tontine element is not
dependent upon the accumulation of dividends, but rather upon
an annual division of profits of an increasing amount among a
decreasing number of people. Hence the prohibition of accumulation has no effect on the charter policy. This tontine aspect of the
charter policy seems relatively innocuous, and it is difficult to
regard it as serious enough in itself to warrant intervention by the
state. The word "tontine" has a pejorative connotation, by reason
of historical associations, which is worse than the term deserves. Not
every tontine element is so evil that it should be forbidden.
In defense of the charter policy, it is sometimes argued that it
does not really contain a tontine feature because the amount of
dividends paid out of nonparticipating surplus lies within the discretion of the board of directors. The board determines whether
or not it is in the best interests of the policyholders as a group,
and of the company as a whole to distribute the surplus, and how
much to distribute. No fixed sum or guaranteed percentage of surplus is promised to the policyholders. If the board should choose
to distribute such dividends to charter policyholders, it is not
compelled to distribute to the surviving charter policyholders an
amount as large as it might have distributed if the whole group
were alive. In other words, the board of directors may reduce the
total benefits to the group in proportion to the decrease in the
group size. Thus the tontine element is negated.
An answer to this contention, however, is not difficult. While
some contracts may give such discretion to the board, others may
not. If they do not and the amount to be shared is fixed by some
formula, then the policy does contain the tontine element. If,
however, discretion does exist in the board of directors, the discretion may eliminate the tontine element of the policy but it also
destroys the policyholder's guaranteed legal rights to share in surplus. His participation right is at the mercy of the board of directors. Hence, either the policy has a tontine element or it has an even
greater deficiency. Further, while discretion in the board reduces
the similarity of the charter policy to the tontine, this does not
104

See statutes cited in notes 39, 40 supra and regulations cited in note 41 supra.
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prevent the agent from impressing upon the prospect the notion
that he is buying into a tontine contract, i.e., creating an appealing
"tontine illusion." Sales material frequently creates this notion.
For example, the brochure used by one company contained a diagram showing the gains from the lapses and surrenders of both
participating and nonparticipating policies flowing to the charter
policyholders. This not only creates an impression that the profits
will be large, but also that the charter group decreases in size, and
thus, presumably, that an ever decreasing group of persons will
have larger individual shares in a constant or increasing fund. Even
if discretion exists in the board and there is misrepresentation, the
misrepresentation is obnoxious. If there is a special likelihood of
misrepresentation, the arrangement is especially objectionable because of that likelihood. The probability of misrepresentation does
seem great enough to give concern about the charter policy, despite
the relatively innocuous character of the tontine element itself.
This likelihood of misrepresentation is in addition to that which
is characteristic of profit-sharing policies generally.

2. Violation of the Anti-Discrimination Statutes
The charter policy is a modern version of an old promotional
technique-the use of the "advisory board" contract. In the latter,
a company
"offers to prospective policyholders a percentage of the premiums paid on policies issued by the company in that state
[or other specified area] over a fixed period of years. This
percentage is to be divided among the policyholders, within
this class, in proportion to the amount of insurance taken out
by each. The class of policyholders entitled to this benefit is
limited . . . . In return therefor the insured, in addition to
paying his annual premium, agrees to become a member of a
special 'advisory board' or 'board of reference,' or to become
a 'special agent' or a 'local inspector,' and to render certain
services to the company, such as advising the company as to
the fitness and desirability of applicants for insurance . . . .
In some instances the insured agrees to furnish annually the
names of ten persons in his community who would ... make
desirable risks .... " 105
Professor Patterson has pointed out the purpose of the advisory
board contract:
105 PA'ITERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES

315 (1927).
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"It is designed to offer to the earlier insurants ... a reduction
in rates which will enable it to compete with the attractions of
the older companies .... [Generally] the courts have held that
this marketing device is illegal, either on the ground that it is
a 'discrimination' if the special benefits are stipulated in the
policy or on the ground that it constitutes 'rebating' if the
benefits are stipulated for in a collateral arrangement outside
the policy." 106
It is true, of course, that an advisory board contract may be a
legitimate manner in which to acquire needed services. There is
no public policy which prevents the compensation of persons for
the performance of valuable services even if they be only the provision of good contacts. In fact, however, most advisory board contracts existed merely to enable the salesman to sell policies, hopefully without violating the laws against rebating or discrimination.
Since the issuance of an advisory board contract was frequently a
subterfuge, it could easily be argued that it was a rebate or an
illegal discrimination; moreover, most states passed specific legislation prohibiting advisory board contracts on these grounds. At
the present time section 3(£) of the Unfair Trade Practices Act
makes it an unfair or deceptive practice to "issue . . . any special
or advisory board or other contracts of any kind promising returns
and profits as an inducement to insurance ...." 107
Today, essentially the same purpose is served by the issuance of
a charter policy which, like the advisory board contract, promises
the policyholder that, as a member of a limited group, he will participate with special advantage, not available to the holders of other
types of policies issued by the same company, in any future distribution of corporate profits including the "profits" or surplus
generated by policies other than the charter policies. The charter
policy is used in an attempt to achieve what can no longer be
achieved by advisory board contracts because of the statutory prohibitions; the same sales argument is still used. The formal advisory
service feature was a mere fac;ade and could easily be sacrificed.
Some companies say they are giving charter policyholders something extra in lieu of advertising expense. Other sales presentations
speak of "long range advisory assistance"; still other arrangements
require name referrals to lend plausibility to the payment of a
106
107

Id. at 316.

1 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 202 n.13. An Advisory Board is now sometimes used to promote the sale of stock rather than policies. See, e.g., Prospectus of
National Western Life Insurance Company, Jan. 9, 1963, p. 20.
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special benefit. Thus, it is clear that the charter policy is functionally a close relative of the old advisory board technique. It is at
least arguable that such policies are forbidden by section 3(£). If
not, then the general anti-discrimination or anti-rebating provisions
may apply as in the old advisory board cases. The close similarity
of the functional characteristics of the advisory board contract and
charter policies make the cases dealing with the former, in the early
l 900's, relevant to the latter.
·
The advisory board contract began to appear in the opinions of
the appellate courts in 1901, often involving suits by the company
against the policyholder on a premium note. The policyholder's
defense was that the policy, and therefore the premium note, was
void because it was connected with a contract under which the
policyholder was appointed to an advisory board or was made one
of a number of "vice-counselors." Usually the policy did not mention the advisory board contract. The Indiana Appellate Court
thought that even if the appointment of the policyholder as a vicecounsellor were void, the policy was still effective since the two were
separate transactions. 108 The North Carolina Supreme Court also
enforced premium notes.109 On the other hand, the Michigan Supreme Court thought that the illegality of the advisory board contract infected the contract of insurance and therefore the company
could not recover on the premium note.11° In these cases, the
Indiana and North Carolina courts did not decide that the contracts were illegal, but the language of the opinions suggests that
they would have so decided if the question had been fairly raised.
The Michigan court did hold the contract illegal. The principal
difference was in the courts' views on the technical doctrine of
severance; by separating the two contracts, Indiana and North
Carolina were able to uphold the insurance policy without reaching
the question of legality.
In a second Indiana case, a receiver for a company sued on an
unpaid portion of the premium which had not been paid because
it was the sum due the policyholder under a special "combination"
contract. The company was a mutual, which argued for equality
among its members. Moreover, its articles and by-laws made every
member an advisory agent "entitled to all its rights and privileges as
fully as any other member." The court enforced the receiver's
claim, saying that
10s
109
110

Muller v. State Life Ins. Co., 27 Ind. App. 45, 60 N.E. 958 (1901).
Security Life 8e Annuity Co. v. Costner, 149 N.C. 293, 63 S.E. 304 (1908).
State Life Ins. Co. v. Strong, 127 Mich. 346, 86 N.W. 825 (1901).
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"[P]ersons not parties to this arrangement ... must pay in
addition to the cost of their own insurance an additional ...
[amount] for the benefit of others.... The plan is marked not
by mutuality but by inequality and unfairness." 111
Another form of action was suit by the policyholder on the
advisory contract itself. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied
recovery, applying the general rule that a court will leave the
parties to an illegal contract where it finds them.112 The anti-discrimination statute, the court emphasized, was intended for the
protection of the whole body of policyholders and not those seeking to profit by the inequity of the contract. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also refused recovery by the policyholder on the
advisory contract.113 If the services had been substantial and really
performed, the court would have regarded the arrangement as
valid, but it was convinced this was merely a device to camouflage
discriminatory practices.
In Wisconsin the problem arose in still a different context. A
policyholder sued in one case to recover the first annual premium,
although the policy was accompanied by a contract irrevocably
appointing the policyholder a member of the company's state
board of special agents for twenty years. The court allowed recovery
because of the promptness of the rescission. 114 However, the court
refused another policyholder's claim to recover four annual payments already made, pointing to the bad effect upon other policyholders if favored ones were permitted, after having the benefit of
the contract, to make claims on the company's surplus, or to rescind
the contract and recover the premiums.115
In a curious case, an agent sought an injunction against breach
of the agency agreement by a refusal by the company to accept applications for special policies connected with contracts appointing
"local inspectors." The Georgia Supreme Court denied the relief,
111 Robison v. Wolf, 27 Ind. App. 683, 691, 62 N.E. 74, 77 (1901). See also State Life Ins.
Co. v. Strong, supra note 110, at 350-51, 86 N.W. at 826.
112 Smathers v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 151 N.C. 98, 65 S.E. 746 (1909).
11s Richmond v. Conservative Life Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 334, 165 N.W. 286 (1917). The
Des Moines Life Insurance Company had issued many special agent's contracts of the
kind invalidated in the prior cases by the supreme court; it sought to keep faith with
such policyholders by replacing these contracts with fifteen-payment life policies backdated to the date of the original contract, but the Attorney General ruled that this
action would be a rebate on the ground that the initial contracts were entirely void.
1908 WIS. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. AND OPINIONS 463.
114 Urwan v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 125 Wis. 349, 103 N.W. 1102 (1905).
115 Laun v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 555, 111 N.W. 660 (1907).
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basing its action on the illegality of the contract under the statute
prohibiting advisory board and similar contracts.116
The advisory contract appeared in a variety of regulatory
problems also. In Wisconsin, the Attorney General first advised the
Insurance Commissioner, upon request, that an advisory contract
was a violation of the anti-rebate statute, and then said in a subsequent opinion that a contract for the appointment of "special
inspectors" or of "special agents" without real duties was within
his prior ruling. 117 The Wisconsin legislature removed all doubts
about the particular form when in 1907 it made the advisory board
contract illegal. 118
In Mississippi, the court was asked to order the Insurance Commissioner to revoke a company license for issuing contracts illegal
under the anti-discrimination statute. Although the court agreed
that there had been a violation, it regarded mandamus as an inappropriate remedy, since the Commissioner's action was discretionary, not ministerial. 119 In Michigan, the supreme court denied mandamus to compel the Commissioner to license the complainant
company, because the company's operation violated the anti-rebate
law.120
Despite the variety of ways in which the problem arose, and
despite the fact that the companies won a number of the decisions,
the overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition
that advisory board and similar contracts, under whatever name,
are illegal. Only one court has thus far thought otherwise. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted an injunction to prevent the Insurance Commissioner from revoking a company's license to do
business in Alabama, holding that the questioned contract, which
was in all essential respects like the contracts involved in prior
cases discussed above, was not objectionable under Alabama law.121
The court thought there was "discrimination" only if different
members of a class of policyholders were treated differently, and in
this case all members were treated alike. The court remarked that
if the term "class" applied to all persons of like individual characLeonard v. American Life & Annuity Co., 139 Ga. 274, 77 S.E. 41 (1913).
1904 WIS. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. AND OPINIONS 368; 1906 id. 618. But compare
the earlier opinion in 1904, id. at 295, holding that there was nothing illegal on the face
of an advisory board contract.
118 Wis. Laws 1907, ch. 504 § 1955(3), now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 207.04(1)(£) (1957). Note
that the problem of validity of earlier contracts continued to arise in the cases for many
years thereafter. See note 11!! supra.
110 Cole v. State, 91 Miss. 628, 45 So. 11 (1907).
120 Citizens' Life Ins. Co. v. Commission, 128 Mich. 85, 87 N.W. 126 (1901).
121 Julian v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 159 Ala. 533, 49 So. 234 (1909).
110

117
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teristics, an insurance company could not change any of the terms
of the contracts that it issued. This would impair freedom of contract. The position of the court is plausible, but it is doubtful that
it is sound. Professor Patterson thought that the "reasoning [was]
question-begging, since it would permit the insurer to discriminate
with impunity simply by multiplying the number of 'classes' of
policyholders."122 Under the decision, companies could evade and
nullify the intent of the anti-discrimination statute.
Professor Patterson himself has cast some doubt on the soundness of the advisory board cases:
"[I]t can scarcely be denied that the first thousand policyholders in a newly formed life company receive less protection
value per $1000 of insurance than do the second thousand; for
while the protection is the same by a purely legalistic standard
(that is, the amount of money which the insurer obligates itself
to pay), the early insurants take the grave risk that the new
company may not survive the dangerous first years. Hence, it is
quite arguable that to allow the early policyholders a reduction
in premium is no 'discrimination' .... [T]he 'discrimination'
in favor of earlier insurants is no discrimination at all but is
merely adjusting the premium charge to fit the actual protection which the insurant receives." 123
There is some merit to his point. It is doubtful, of course, that the
salesman of the specialty policy would be willing to admit to his
prospect this justification for a rate differential. But if the terms of
the policy are to be justified as against the anti-discrimination
statute on the basis of the greater risk inherent in the purchase of
a policy during the early years of a company's life, it would seem
appropriate that the policyholder be apprised of the reasons for
his advantage. Instead, the appeal is to his cupidity. Despite his
theoretical justification for the issuance of advisory board contracts,
Professor Patterson recognized that the system "is deceptive because, like most other 'cheap insurance' schemes, it leads the
average policyholder to believe that he is getting something for
nothing. He is led to think that he is among the 'favored few,' and
cupidity outruns caution."124 Moreover, if the advisory board contract were justified as non-discriminatory, in view of the greater
risk that the early policyholders run, there perhaps should be some
consideration of whether the risk and the preferential treatment are
122 PATTERSON, op.
12s Id. at 317-18.
124 Id. at 318.

cit. supra note 105,

at

317.
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reasonably related to one another, or whether the preferential treatment of the advisory board policyholder is excessive in relation to
the extra risk that is incurred. It may be the other way around;
the extra risk may be substantial, while the preferential treatment
is meager-grossly exaggerated in sales presentation but in actuality hedged by language in the contract itself.
So far as appears from appellate opinions and other readily
accessible sources, the advisory board contract did not survive the
first decade or so after its introduction. If it were reintroduced in
the same form, it would certainly be held illegal everywhere, in
view of the overwhelming weight of authority. The case is even
stronger now in view of the widespread enactment of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act, section 3(g) of which forbids a company to
"make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of individuals between those of the same class and equal expectation of
life ... in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon . . . ,"
and section 3(£) of which explicitly forbids the advisory board contract.
The question that remains is whether the advisory board contract cases are applicable to its modern counterpart, the charter
policy. Section 3(£) seems to contemplate a separate inducement and
may not be applicable. Two distinctions throw doubt on the applicability of the anti-discrimination provision of section 3(g). One is
that the charter policy imposes no duties upon the favored policyholders, although the duties in the advisory board contracts were
merely apparent. However, the charter policy is not less, but rather
more objectionable because no attempt is made to give even the
appearance of consideration for the extra benefits to be received.
Another distinction is that the advisory board contract was collateral to, but dependent upon a separate insurance policy, while
the charter policy combines the entire transaction in one contract.
Hence, the charter policy seems even more clearly to be in violation of the anti-discrimination statute.
On the whole, therefore, it seems to be sound for charter policies which contain a profit-sharing feature to be held illegal under
the anti-discrimination statutes on the authority of the advisory
board contract cases decided early in the century; for practical
purposes the two are the same. The Wisconsin Insurance Department thought the statute applicable; it prohibited the issuance of
charter policies, holding that the charter policy violated not only
section 3(£) of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, but also the more
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general anti-discrimination provision in section 3(g).124a The charter policyholder, like the old advisory board policyholder, either
has an unfair advantage over other policyholders or he is misled in the sales presentation by an appeal to his greed. The
charter policy, like the profit-sharing policy, is inherently misleading to the policyholder or is discriminatory against other policyholders. There seems no middle position into which it can fall; in
either event the charter policy, like its predecessor, is objectionable.
Because of its recent development (or its recent notoriety), there
is little direct authority on the charter policy. One interesting case
did appear in Minnesota, however. A charter policyholder, as
representative of his class, sought an accounting, contending that
while the directors had given special treatment to the charter
policyholders, they had not fairly allocated to them all that they
were entitled to receive. In effect, the special dividend provision
secured to the charter policyholder, after five years, a return of
one hundred percent of the surplus generated by his class of policies. On the other hand, the dividend provision in the noncharter
policies provided that the policyholder would share in the surplus
(necessarily surplus other than that generated by the charter policies) as ascertained and apportioned by the company. The effort
backfired, however. On its own motion, the court asked whether
it was not a violation of the Minnesota statutes to set up the charter
members as a favored class, and sent the case back for consideration
of the question, suggesting that the trial court see that the noncharter policyholders were represented by counsel of their own.125
On the second round, the court held that the participating provisions of the charter policies were in violation of the anti-discrimination statute and decreed an accounting, subjecting the future
earnings of the charter policies to a lien in favor of the noncharter
policies.126 If the old advisory board cases are sound, it is hard to
question this decision.
C. Methods of Control of Profit-Sharing and Charter Policies
The foregoing analysis has shown that both a special susceptibility to misrepresentation and a discriminatory character are
inherent in these classes of policies. If the first defect were all we
had to combat, it would be important to answer the question
whether the dangers of misrepresentation were so substantial that
124a See note
125 Lommen
126 Lommen

102 supra.
v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 608, 289 N.W. 582 (1940).
v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 577, 4 N.W.2d 639 (1942).
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they could not effectively be countered by enforcement of existing
laws against misrepresentation, or by the development of new laws
forbidding specific kinds of misrepresentation. An earlier article
has shown the difficulties in control of that kind, 127 but despite those
difficulties one should be reluctant to use the stringent weapon of
prohibition unless failure to do so would present serious consequences. A number of states have tried the intermediate method;
some have prohibited the use of such terms as "profit-sharing" or
"charter" either in the policy or in advertising material.128 Others
have prohibited a long list of statements and practices, not only for
these policies but also for others. 129 But charter and profit-sharing
policies are not only peculiarly susceptible to misrepresentation,
but are objectionable on other grounds as well. There is little
justification for continuing their use. Even if the principle of freedom of contract might overcome our inclination to prohibit in
order to prevent misrepresentation, it can hardly be argued that
freedom of contract should also overcome the strong policy of the
law in favor of doing equity among groups of policyholders so
far as is possible. Profit-sharing and charter policies should be prohibited on the ground that they seriously compromise important
values sought by the legal system. 130

D. The Applicability of Securities Legislation
On November 30, 1960, Mr. Harold G. Lohren of the Securities and Exchange Commission addressed the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners and, after describing the profit-sharing
policy, said:
"Now, when we get into the area of inducing the sale of insurance through a feature in a policy such as I have been de121 See Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L.
REY. 141 (1961).
128 E.g., Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 33, Aug. 8, 1961; Ga. Dep't of Ins. Reg. June 24,
1958; Nev. Dep't of Ins. Bull. 58-4, July 1, 1958; N.D. Dep't of Ins. Reg., April 10, 1961;
S.C. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 1-60, 1960; Ind. Dep't of Ins. circular letter Dec. 16, 1959.
Many of the regulations in this and the following two footnotes will be found in the
WEE!tLY UNDERWRITER, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT SERVICE.
120 E.g., Colo. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 37, Nov. 1, 1962; Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09,
Oct. 31, 1962; Kan. Ins. Dep't Reg. 48-11-10, June 13, 1963; Ky. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Feb. 9,
1959; Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. III-9, Jan. 19, 1962; Neb. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Rule 26,
Dec. 20, 1962; N.M. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Reg., Aug. 6, 1962; Wyo. Ins. Dep't Bull. 116,
July 3, 1962.
130 Seyeral states have enunciated outright prohibitions of profit-sharing policies, e.g.,
statement made by the California Insurance Commissioner, J. of Commerce, March 7,
1960, p. 9, col. l; La. Dep't of Ins. Reg. Nov. 13, 1962; Utah Dep't of Ins. Bull. 60-5,
May 16, 1960; W. Va. Ins. Dep't Ruling No. 3311, May 13, 1963; Wis. Adm. Code section
Ins. 2.08 (1962).
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scribing, which represents nothing more nor less than a participation in a profit-sharing arrangement-and I use those
words advisedly because then I put my finger on one of the
fundamental definitions of a security as defined in the Securities Act of 1933, a profit-sharing arrangement, an investment
contract. And at this juncture, the Commission gets concerned,
so that we have a dual concern with the Insurance Commissioners and the insurance industry as well as the securities
side. . . .
"I don't know what the solution to the problem is. In the
Commission, in such instances as we have run across these policies-and I could say that I have hit about 25 different ones in
the last two to three years-we have taken the position that a
security is involved. We have advised the company that it
should register that security if it proposes to sell it, and we
have also taken the position that an investment company is
involved." 181
If Mr. Lohren is correct, and the profit-sharing policy is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
regulation by that federal agency provides a method of control
that might be fairly effective. Submission to the registration and
disclosure provisions of the securities legislation would be inconvenient to insurance companies, which already must comply with
a complex regime of state insurance regulation. Of course, insurance companies are now subject to securities regulation when
they issue stock, and this applies also to offbeat issues, such as
guaranty fund certificates.182 Here, however, we are talking about
what are basically insurance policies. A threat of intervention by
the Commission would tend, in most cases, to induce the company
not to sell the questioned policy. Moreover, if the policy is a security
subject to registration and is not registered, the policyholder will
be able to rescind and get his full premium back. This would be a
stringent sanction which would probably be quite effective.183
For these reasons it becomes of some importance for us to consider the question of whether the Securities and Exchange Commission has jurisdiction, and if so, whether it should exercise its
LIFE COMM. REPORT, N.A.I.C., 19-31, Nov. 30, 1960.
Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962).
188 Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1958).
Misrepresentations through the mails or other means of interstate communication also
produce this result. 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Ul58). See also Securities
Act of 1933, § 16, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958); Securities Act of 1933, § 24g,
48 Stat. 87, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1958).
181
182
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power. The starting point is the McCarran Act, which provides
in section 2(b):
"No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ...." 134
If the Securities Act "specifically relates to the business of insurance," it has effect despite state regulation. If it does not "specifically relate," it can have effect only if it does not invalidate, impair,
or supersede, the state laws respecting insurance. Although the
matter is not free from doubt, it is possible that, as Mr. Lohren
suggested, an insurance policy of the profit-sharing type is a security within the basic definition of section 2 of the Securities Act,
which says that "the term 'security' means any . . . certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement ...." 135
The doubt is suggested by the language of the House of Representatives Report on the Securities Bill. The Committee said that the
exemption of insurance

"makes clear what is already implied in the act, namely, that
insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities subject
to the provisions of the act. The insurance policy and like
contracts are not regarded in the commercial world as securities .... The entire tenor of the act would lead, even without
this specific exemption, to the exclusion of insurance policies
from the provisions of the act, but the specific exemption is
included to make misinterpretation impossible."136
A profit-sharing agreement of the type with which we are presently concerned is a part of an ordinary insurance policy, arising
within the framework of the insurance institution, and the profitsharing feature is only peripheral to it. It is possible, of course, that
there may be similar contracts in which the insurance aspect is
the merest pretense; in such case this argument is not valid. But
we are concerned here with contracts which are largely insurance,
whatever may be the representations of the soliciting agents. In
the absence of a strong showing that the Securities Act was intended
to pick up every contract containing any security element, an
institutionally or functionally oriented analysis would lead to a
134
185
186

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1958).
Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(i) (1958).
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).
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conclusion that we are not dealing with securities, but rather with
insurance.
On the assumption, however, that the profit-sharing policy is a
"security," section 3 of the act then goes on to exempt certain
classes of securities from the provisions of the act, except as expressly provided. One of the exempt securities is "any insurance or
endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract,
issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the United
States or the District of Columbia . . . ." 187 Finally, section 17,
which proscribes certain fraudulent acts, states that the exemptions
of section 3 do not apply to the provisions of section 17.138
It would be difficult to argue that a profit-sharing policy of the
type with which we have been dealing is not an insurance policy.
Moreover,' all states regulate the life insurance business. That
being the case, application of the exemption of section 3 seems
clear; the registration and disclosure provisions of the Securities
Act seem not to apply to the profit-sharing policy even if it is
admitted to be a security within the meaning of the act. The case
is less clear with respect to section 17, where the exemption does
not apply. It is possible to argue that the explicit exemption in
section 3 is a kind of specific reference to insurance that, when it is
negated by section 17, makes the latter section "specifically relate
to the business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran
Act. 139 It is possible to argue this, and thus to urge that the fraud
section of the Securities Act is applicable to insurance, even if the
registration and disclosure provisions are not. It is also necessary to
argue this, for unless the section does specifically relate to insurance
it may not invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws. The argument is not really persuasive, for it makes better sense to interpret
the negation of the exemption as leaving the act as if there were no
listing of insurance at all. This is all the more likely to be true because the legislative history of the act shows that the purpose of
the exemption for insurance was to make clear "what is already
implied in the act, namely, that insurance policies are not to be
Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(8) (1958).
Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (1958). Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § lO(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78G)(b) (1958) is even more extensively used
in fraud cases. The exemption does not apply to it.
1s11 This same argument does not seem valid for § IO(b), the fraud section of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, since there is no exemption section to provide the
needed reference.
187
138
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regarded as securities subject to the provisions of the act." 140 Although certain insurance policies (but not all) fall within the definition of a security to be found within the act, that is not enough
to subject them to section 17 without specific reference to insurance. It is not enough, that is, unless it can be said that the Securities Act does not invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws regulating insurance, and there can be little room for doubt that
application to profit-sharing policies of registration and disclosure
provisions of the act would seriously impair and partially supersede
the complex regime of state regulation of life insurance. It is only a
little less certain that the same would be true of the application of
the fraud provisions, in view of the existence in every state of some
version of the Uniform Unfair Trade Practices Act. 141 There would
be no impairment and no supersession only if the provisions of the
two acts were completely consistent and complementary, not concurrent. This is hardly conceivable.
An additional possibility for justifying the application of the
fraud provision of the Securities Act to the profit-sharing policy
would be the interpretation of the state securities laws to take the
profit-sharing policy out from under insurance regulation, and subject it to state securities regulation. In that case, the McCarran Act
would no longer be applicable, nor would the exemption of section
3 of the Securities Act, and the whole range of other provisions of
the Securities Act would apply in a proper case. But the tendency in
state legislation is in the other direction. More often than not, the
exemption in the state securities act for insurance is broader than
in the federal securities legislation. For example, the Iowa Securities Act exempts from application of the act "any security ...
issued by . . . any life insurance company under the insurance
department of this state."142
A final possibility is the determination that for purposes of
federal law, the profit-sharing policy is not an insurance contract
at all, but rather is a security or investment, by analogy to the treatment of the variable annuity given in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. 143 But in the view of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for
the Court in the case, the variable annuity was not insurance beSee note 136 supra; l Loss, SECURlTIES REcuLATION 497, n.116 (2d ed. 1961).
See note 94 supra for discussion of this act.
IOWA CODE § 502.4(6) (1962). See also, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.3(M)
(Smith-Hurd 1953); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-312(5) (1958). Compare Donovan v. Dixon, 261
Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962) with Bates v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 206 Minn.
482, 288 N.W. 834 (1939).
HS 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
HO
141
142
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cause it placed all of the investment risk on the annuitant, i.e., there
was no guarantee of fixed income. The concept of insurance, he felt,
involved some investment risk-taking on the part of the company.
As to the basic portion of the profit-sharing policy, there is investment risk-taking by the company, as well as an assumption of the
mortality risk. It is only in the supplementary features of the
policy that there is anything Mr. Justice Douglas would not regard
as insurance. It would be a remarkable extension of the VALIG
case to say a profit-sharing policy is not insurance, and thus subject
it to the regulatory power of the Securities and Exchange Comm1ss1on.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan144 is another
matter, and the subject cannot be left without recognition of his
position. He was concerned with the question of whether insurance
regulation or investment regulation was the more appropriate
for the variable annuity. He concluded that the latter was, and
he might conceivably reach the same result with respect to profitsharing policies. The pronouncement of Mr. Lohren suggests that
the Commission's thinking runs in the same direction, as does
the recent opinion of the Commission in the Prudential case.145
If it is assumed, contrary to the conclusions of this argument,
that the Securities Act is applicable to the profit-sharing policy,
there remains some question of whether the Commission should
choose this as an appropriate place to exert its influence. Undoubtedly it has more tasks than it has personnel and funds to handle, and
it is doubtful that this is a place where the Commission should try to
make its influence felt, inasmuch as there is now full control over
the life insurance industry at the state level, and it is currently the
public policy of the United States to leave basic decisions about
insurance to be made at that level. Moreover, of the types of specialty policies which this article considers, only profit-sharing and
possibly, under certain interpretations, the tontine are even arguably within the jurisdiction of the Commission. There is merit in
having a single agency which can see the entire problem provide
comprehensive regulation for this whole group of coverages, rather
than attempt a piecemeal regulation. Only the state insurance departments, not the Securities and Exchange Commission, could
provide this comprehensive oversight. The problem is most appropriate for solution by the insurance regulatory authorities; only if
144
145

Id. at 73-93.
Decision of Securities and Exchange Com.mission (File No. 812-1386), Jan. 22, 1963.
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there is no action in that quarter should the Securities and Exchange Commission consider intervening. Even then, the serious
doubt that exists about its power should lead the Commission to
leave the matter alone, despite the fact that some persons in the
life insurance business would welcome the intervention.

VI. COUPON POLICIES
Neither the coupon policy nor vigorous criticism of it is new; as
early as 1905, some companies issued coupon policies. For example,
one policy140 contained nineteen coupons which could be used to
reduce premiums, to purchase additional paid-up life insurance, or
could be left to accumulate interest for the remainder of the coupon
· period of twenty years. In another early policy, we find the coupons
payable annually beginning one year after the insurance date "as a
dividend guaranteed."147 The coupon policy probably developed
from the competition benveen participating and nonparticipating
policies, 148 and at first was commonly referred to as the "guaranteed
dividend" policy. By 1913 approximately sixty companies seem to
have been issuing coupon or guaranteed dividend policies.149
Criticism of the coupon or guaranteed dividend policy began at
once. In a statement to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in 1909, the Oklahoma Commissioner said that the issuance of such policies was "hurting the country," and that "no man
. . . [would] defend it." 150 The Association classed the coupons
with "frills that are foreign to legitimate life insurance" and resolved disapproval, urging its members "to discountenance such
methods as highly deceptive and misleading." 151 The actuary for the
Wisconsin department said the purpose of such a policy was "simply to mislead the public into thinking they will get a big profit on
their money." 152 The conservative companies also criticized the
146 This policy, issued by Security Mutual Life Insurance Co., was discussed in a
letter dated March 24, 1905, which appeared in 10 LIFE INSURANCE CoURANT 265 (1904-1905).
147 Such a policy was involved in Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Wier, 135 Ga. 130, 68 S.E.
1035 (1910).
148 See Cathles, Coupon Policies-Their Advantages and Disadvantages and a Description of an Original Office Method of Caring for Exceptional Policies, 2 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACTUARIES, THE RECORD, pt. 2, at 1 (Nov. 1913). Mr. Cathles was with the
Southwestern Life Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas. "The inability of the participating company to guarantee its dividends formed a tempting opening for the nonparticipating
company ••••" Id. at 2. Policies were issued at participating rates but with guaranteed
premium reductions after the first year.
HO Id. at 8.
150 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, FORTIETH SESSION
39 (1909).
151 Id. at 146-50.
152 Id. at 148.
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policies as misleading; they urged that the word "dividend" and
the word "coupon" suggested a return to the stockholder or policyholder in the nature of profit or interest on principal, whereas in
fact in the coupon policies there is a return of principal. 153 Nor did
the criticism remain merely at this level. The Minnesota legislature
in 1913 flatly prohibited the issuance of coupon policies.154
Criticism, however, did not stop the use of coupon policies,
which have been issued more or less continuously ever since. In
1937, for example, one policy contained coupons that could be
surrendered for cash, applied to reduce the premium, or used to
purchase a pure endowment addition which would increase the
paid-up values of the policy and, if repeated each year, would
mature it as an endowment for the face value after twenty years.m
Another had similar options except that the purchase of a fully
paid-up policy at an earlier date required surrender of all the coupons; an additional option was to let the coupons accumulate at
3 ½ percent compound interest.156
Today a typical coupon policy provides that the coupons may
be used in any of four ways. A coupon may be surrendered to
reduce the premium, for a cash amount equal to its face value,
for nonparticipating paid-up additions to coverage, or it may be
held to accumulate with interest for a specified number of years.
Additional options occasionally exist. One, for example, would
permit the policyholder to direct the company to pay the money
to anyone he designated; the intention of the company was to encourage the use of the coupons to buy stock from a designated
broker. Another would use the coupons to buy shares in an affiliated
mutual fund, 157 and still another to buy shares in the insurance
company itself.158
It is uncertain how widespread the present use of coupon policies is. However, recent action of several states to prohibit or control coupons is an indication of extensive use. Two states now have
prohibitory statutes.159 Within the past few years seven state m15s

See Cathles, supra note 148, pt. 2, p. 3.

154 Minn. Laws 1913, ch. 443, § 1, now MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945).
155 Such a policy was involved in Adroin v. Great So. Life Ins. Co., 186 La. 583, 173
So. 112 (1937).
156 Such a policy was involved in General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 130 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1942).
157 An arrangement such as this was involved in the Matter of MidAmerica Mutual
Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3612, Jan. 11, 1963.
158 See Prospectus of National Western Life Ins. Co., Jan. 9, 1963, p. 3. Cf. Prospectus
of National Sec. Life Ins. Co., March I, 1962, p. 7.
159 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-503 (1960). Also, in
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surance departments have prohibited them, 160 and fifteen departments have issued regulations using other methods of control.161
But until quite recently coupon policies were legal in nearly all
the states and were issued by dozens of companies.162 It is not pos~ible. to be much more precise without an unprofitably extensive
mqmry.
A coupon added to a life insurance policy is not fundamentally
complicated. In lay language, the level premium life insurance
contract can be regarded as a combination insurance policy and
savings account. The savings account grows throughout the life
of the policy, while the insured sum decreases. The total of the two
is equal to the amount payable under the policy. When coupons
are appended to the contract, it merely means that an additional
and separate savings element is added, and the coupon options do
no more than state what the policyholder is permitted to do with
the extra savings account that he has established with the insurance
1963 the Kansas legislature repealed § 40-430, which had affirmatively permitted the issuance of coupon policies. Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 262, § I.
160 See Mich. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Oct. 19, 1962; N.D. Dep't of Ins. Reg., April 10,
1961; W. Va. Ins. Dep't Rule No. 3311, May 13, 1963; Wis. Adm. Code section Ins.
2.08 (1962); N.J. Dep't of Banking and Ins., Reg. No. I-1963A-l, July 15, 1963. A
companion to the last regulation, No. I-1963A-2, prohibits the use of passbooks and
language referring either to "passbooks" or "premium deposits" or similar language
suggesting savings. Most of these regulations may be found in the WEEKLY UNDERWRITER,
INS. DEP'T SERVICE. See also letter from Charles C. Dubuar, Chief Actuary of N.Y. Ins.
Dep't, to Pak H. Louis, July 29, 1952; letter from Carl Stumer, Deputy Commissioner of
Dep't of Ins. of S.D., to Charles Manson, Commissioner of Wis. Dep't of Ins., Nov. 30,
1961.
161 These regulations are of two types. The first embodies a disclosure approach; it
requires that the amount of the gross premium allocated to the coupon be stated on the
face of the policy. See Fla. Dep't of Ins., Bull. No. 33, Aug. 8, 1961; Kan. Ins. Dep't
Rule 48-11-10, ,r I, July 1, 1963; La. Dep't of Ins., ,r 5, Nov. 13, 1962; N.C. Ins. Dep't
Reg., July 15, 1960; S.C. Ins. Comm'n, Reg., July 31, 1962; Va. Corp. Comm'n Reg.,
Sept. 22, 1958; letter from Earl Nicholson, Deputy and Actuary of the Nev. Ins. Dep't,
Aug. 24, 1962. Ga. Dep't of Ins. Regulation, June 24, 1958, employs a modified disclosure
approach by allowing the company the option of stating separately the amount of the
premium for the coupon or of stating on the face of the policy that "the premium
above includes an extra premium for coupon benefits." The second type is a limited
prohibition. Five insurance departments attempt to regulate coupon policies by prohibiting language which states or implies that coupons represent interest earnings, return
on investment, etc. See Ill. Dep't of Ins. Reg. 9.09, § 5(9), Oct. 31, 1962; announcement
made by the Ind. Dep't of Ins., Dec. 16, 1959; Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. 111-9, Jan. 19,
1962; Va. State Corp. Comm. Reg., Sept. 22, 1958; Wyo. Ins. Dep't Reg. ,r 2(c), July 3,
1962. There are two proposed regulations: N.M. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Reg., ,r 2(c),
Aug. 6, 1962; Neb. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Rule No. 26, Dec. 20, 1962. The Nebraska
proposed regulation talks in terms of a "series of one-year pure endowments or a series
of guaranteed periodic benefit," which would include coupons. But in light of NEB.
REv. STAT. § 44-503 (1960), which already prohibits coupons, this regulation appears to
go farther and prevent efforts to avoid the statute by a change in form. Most of these
regulations may be found in the ,VEEKLY UNDERWRITER, INS. DEP'T SERVICE.
162 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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company. Technically, coupons "should be treated as a series of
pure endowments in the calculation of minimum cash values under
the Standard Nonforfeiture Law." 163 An endowment is essentially
a savings element in an insurance policy.

A. Objections to Coupons
There is nothing sinister or even objectionable about a savings
account. Indeed, it is widely thought to be a good thing for private
persons to save money in a capitalistic society, for some of the money
is likely to be channeled into investment in new enterprise, as a
result of which the economy expands. If there is nothing objectionable about a savings account, there is nothing inherently wrong
with a high-savings insurance policy, or with a pure endowment.
Likewise there is nothing wrong with a coupon in itself.
I. Inherent Vice in the Coupon Policy
But is it objectionable in the way it is used? This question has
two aspects. It may be asked first whether the combination of an
insurance policy and a series of pure endowments is bad when
neither is bad in itself, simply because the combination has no
legitimate economic function, because it tends to increase the cost
of insurance, because it makes pure insurance unavailable to those
who need it, or for any other reason? Second, is the coupon policy
evil because it is peculiarly susceptible to misrepresentation and
deception?
It would be hard to argue that it is always bad in itself to combine insurance coverage and savings. To so argue would lead inevitably to the further proposition that all forms of life insurance
other than term insurance are bad. Ordinary life insurance, limited
payment life insurance, and endowment policies are all combinations of pure life insurance with a savings element. Both insurance
and savings are benign institutions, and in combination as well as
apart they are valuable adjuncts of the economy. Nor it is easy to
argue that it is bad per se to have such a large savings component as
exists in the coupon policy. The savings component of the usual
coupon policy is not as large as that in many endowment policies
issued by the most conservative companies. It cannot be argued
that the high-savings insurance policy is evil if it is sold to people
who want it or need it. It would be equally difficult to say that the
163 See Report of the Hooker Committee of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 119
(1951).
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coupon policy is inherently bad if it is sold to the right people. Nor
would the existence of coupon policies necessarily exclude term insurance or lower-price ordinary life insurance from the market,
making them unavailable to people who need them. One must conclude, unless there are arguments which are not apparent, that there
is nothing in the nature of the coupon policy that makes it unsuitable as a commodity readily available in the market, provided only
that it is not put into the hands of people who are in need of something else.

2. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation
Before there should be a prohibition of the issuance of coupon
policies in order to prevent misrepresentation and misleading of
policyholders, there should be a showing that the problem is serious
and that it cannot be solved or sufficiently ameliorated in any other
way. It is necessary, therefore, that we attempt to determine how
serious the problem is and whether it can be solved by steps short
of prohibiting the use of coupons.
The choice of the word "dividend" in connection with these
policies has sometimes been attacked as misleading in itself, and
prohibition of its use has been proposed. It is true that the word
"dividend" suggests profits, by virtue of its long association with
the distribution of corporate profits to stockholders. Indeed, for
many years there have been actuaries who have objected to its use
in connection with any life insurance policies, since "dividends"
under a participating policy, and "guaranteed dividends" under a
nonparticipating coupon policy, are both repayments of overcharges rather than profits in the usual sense. But this proves too
much, for if use of the term "dividend" were to be forbidden, it
would require a change of terminology for all participating insurance, and there is no serious contention that the term is sufficiently misleading when used by the conservative participating
companies to justify prohibiting its use.
The word "coupon" has also been asserted to be misleading,
because of its long association with the payment of interest on
bonds. Thus, it is thought to mislead policyholders into supposing
that the coupons represent interest or profits on the principal,
rather than the return of overcharges. There may be an element
of truth in this assertion, but it is doubtful that there is enough
for this alone to justify restrictive legislation. Webster has several
definitions for "coupon." One is "a certificate of interest due ... ,"
but other definitions are "a section, as of a ticket or certificate, show-
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ing the holder to be entitled to some service or right," "a certificate
given with a purchase of goods and redeemable in merchandise or
cash," and "a part of a printed advertisement designed to be cut
off for use as an order blank." The idea that is common to all these
definitions is the existence of a physically separable portion of a
contract that is to be separated and exchanged for something. Thus
the ordinary usage of the term is wide enough to include use with
an insurance policy, and it is hard to mount an attack on coupon
policies merely because of the use of the term "coupon." Of course,
it is possible to use the term in a context in which it contributes to
deception, but this is probably no more true than with most other
words.
Since there seems to be no legitimate objection to coupons based
on terminology alone, let us consider the way in which they are
used. Although there is little criticism of high-savings insurance
policies when considered as commodities available for people who
want them, there is much criticism of the widespread sale of highsavings policies. It comes in part from competitors, such as the
sellers of mutual fund shares, and in part from less interested observers. Such criticism depends in essence upon the propositions that
(1) for most insurance buyers the quantity of insurance protection
they actually need can be afforded only if they minimize immediate
drain on income through the use of term insurance or a combination of term and ordinary life insurance, while (2) for buyers who
have income left for saving after buying adequate life insurance
protection the rate of return on savings in life insurance policies is
relatively low, and a better return can be obtained with reasonable
safety by investing in mutual funds or in other ways, and (3) that
these facts, or alleged facts, are not generally known to prospective
buyers of insurance and it is to the interest of the sellers of highsavings policies to keep them from being known. In essence, then,
the objection to the high-savings insurance policy is that it is sold
to people who would be better off with something else, but do not
realize it. The arguments thus made apply not only to coupon
policies but also, though in lesser measure, to many policies of
conservative insurance companies, whether participating or nonparticipating. The argument is often persuasively made and probably has considerable merit. It hardly seems doubtful that many
insurance buyers would be better off with more insurance protection and a smaller commitment to savings in the form of life insurance. But it is a long step from this conclusion to an argument
for control or prohibition of high-savings insurance. In a free so-
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ciety in which the state does not assume the duty and the prerogative of telling citizens what they should buy, it is hard to advocate
with justification the control or prohibition of a commodity that
is not harmful in itself and that has a beneficial use. Indeed, it
should not be done because of a mere possibility of sale to persons
who should not buy, but should be done only if there is misrepresentation and misunderstanding in enough cases to create a
serious problem requiring control by public agencies. Substantial
possibility of misrepresentation and misunderstanding is necessary
to justify concern about the use of coupon policies. Two aspects of
the typical coupon policy seem to make it peculiarly susceptible to
misrepresentation. One is in the form of the policy-the coupon
itself, and the other is the usual failure to separate the cost of the
coupons from the cost of the basic policy, which leads to the obscuring of information about cost.
The form of the coupon policy facilitates misrepresentation because of its similarity to the coupon that represents interest or
profits. One sales presentation included the following statement:
"Here is a page of coupons .... They are colored green to look like
money because they actually represent money . . . . [T]here are
several things you can do with your coupons. You can clip these out
upon maturity, just like in a bond and exchange them for cash."164
Salesmen frequently tell prospects that coupon policies are bonds,
securities, investments and so forth. 165 Possible misconception is
furthered by the pains taken to make the coupons a prominent
and attractive part of the policy.
"The coupons are devised to give the appearance of the interest coupons that are frequently attached to investment
bonds. Although the face amount of the coupon benefit is
essentially a refund of premium previously paid by a policyholder, it is frequently represented that it is the earnings or
return on the investment of the policyholder in life insurance."166
Either express or implied reference is thus made to returns from
stocks, bonds or savings accounts. The fact that the words "profit"
or "investment" are absent from the coupons and the clauses of
the contract dealing with the coupons does not preclude them from
misleading applicants on many occasions:
164 From our files.
105 See, e.g., letter

Compare the introductory sales presentation, note I supra.
from Carl Stumer, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance of South
Dakota, to Charles Manson, "Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance, Nov. 30, 1961.
106 Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962).
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"To print the coupon in the color and format of interest
coupons commonly attached to investment bonds disguises
the true nature of the product being purchased by the public.
A series of one year endowments affords a special type of benefit which the average life insurance buyer would seldom purchase if he were in possession of the full information concerning the premiums paid for the pure endowment benefits
provided." 167
The use of a passbook instead of coupons may make the form somewhat less objectionable, but probably not decisively so, for passbooks, too, suggest earnings rather than a refund of an overcharge.
In another respect the form of the coupon policy may facilitate
deception, or may itself deceive. It is normal for a coupon policy
to contain only nineteen coupons, the first coupon being payable
at the time the second annual premium is paid, and one being payable at the corresponding time each year thereafter, up to the
twentieth premium payment. There is none associated with the first
premium. The shortage of one coupon is of course quite obvious
to any one who takes the trouble to examine the policy carefully,
but it is not pointed out and may be the basis for misunderstanding
in the case of the unsophisticated applicant. The absence of a
coupon corresponding to the first premium is related to cost of
acquisition, i.e., the sum goes to help pay the heavy first year acquisition costs and especially the agent's commission. One actuary
expressed his dislike for the nineteen coupon arrangement as follows:
"If the agent in his presentation said that . . . they were only
going to give you nineteen coupons and that the first coupon
they were going to keep to build the agency force on, you
might go along with that. Then you would know exactly what
you are getting. Of course, that is never divulged to the applicant. " 1611

Of course a perceptive insurance buyer would realize the facts, but
many are not perceptive.
The probable rejoinder of the coupon-issuing company is not
without relevance. It would point out that the policyholder who
buys ordinary insurance from a conservative company is not told
that he gets no cash value during his first year or even during his
See note appended to Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962).
This was a statement made in discussion by David C. Silletto, Assistant Secretary,
Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., Fort Wayne, Ind., 1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE
OF AaruARIES IN PUBUC PRAcnCE 58.
167
168
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second year, because the first year's premium goes in large part to
pay an agent's commission and other acquisition expenses. This
is true, but the fact that the deceptive possibility is to some extent
common to all insurance policies and all companies should not lead
us to obscure it when we discuss the problems associated with
coupon policies. We deal here with coupon policies, not because
they pose the only problems that exist in the marketing of life insurance, but because the problems which they create are more
serious and difficult than those of more traditional forms of coverage.
In some policies, the coupon matures at the end rather than at
the beginning of the policy year, with the first coupon maturing
only after the policy has been in effect for two years. Since the
policyholder pays his premium at the beginning of the year, if he
dies or lapses during the year, he forfeits the coupon benefit for
which he has already paid. The same thing would be true in any
year of the first twenty. This is a minor problem of the kind which
led, many decades ago, to the enactment of nonforfeiture laws.
More important than the misleading aspects of the form, however, is the usual failure to disclose cost information about the
coupon. Ordinarily the cost of the coupon is not stated separately;
only the total premium is announced to the applicant. Nor is it
possible to ascertain the cost of the coupon by examining the contract, even with great care. In a recent Wisconsin Insurance Department hearing, on cross-examination the following exchange took
place between the witness, a distinguished professor testifying on
behalf of an insurance company issuing coupon policies, and the
attorney for the Wisconsin Association of Life Underwriters:

Q. "Is it possible to scan a contract and determine the cost of
the coupon?"
A. "No."
Q. "So that the buyer of the insurance couldn't by reading
his contract know how much he is paying for the election
of that contract other than coupons, and how much he is
paying for the coupons?"
A. "I think that is correct, yes." 169
100 See Hearing Before the Wis. Dept. of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 65
ijan. 1962). Some efforts at ascertaining cost information may be found in Reply Memorandum, Wis. Ass'n of Life Underwriters and Wis. Life Convention to the Wisconsin
Insurance Department, In the matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed Rule Ins.
2.08 of the Wisconsin Adm. Code, pp. 18-23. One cannot use the results with confidence,
but the figures are suggestive. See also Reply Brief of General Life Ins. Corp., pp. 7-9.
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At the same hearing, a spokesman for the department stated that
"it is doubtful that many policyholders [of coupon policies] understand the premium which they pay at the beginning of the year
contains a charge to provide the funds from which the coupon can
be paid by the company at the end of the year." 170 Inability to learn
the price of the coupon prevents the applicant from comparing the
cost of the benefit with its value. Indeed, the agent may allow the
policyholder to infer, may suggest, or may even affirmatively represent to the prospect, that the whole face value of the coupon represents a return on investment, instead of a return of investment.
Even if the agent does not so misrepresent, there is a substantial
likelihood of this misunderstanding. If, for example, the gross annual premium is $100.00 the face value of the coupon is $10.00 and
the cost of the coupon $9.70, then the actual return on the amount
invested in the coupon is about three percent, but since the face
value of the coupon is ten percent of the gross premium, the policyholder may think he is getting a ten percent return. This misconception is made possible by the failure to state separately on the
face of the policy the amount of the premium allocated to the
coupon.
The possibility that a policyholder will misunderstand the
nature of a coupon policy is increased by the varied benefits that
are contained in many coupon policies. Though the four basic
options generally available are familiar in connection with ordinary
dividends on orthodox policies, coupon policies seem to have
greater variability. Additional options are also possible. One policy
contains a sweeping fifth option that permits the policyholder to
use, transfer, or assign the coupon to anyone for any purpose he
may designate. In fact, that company expected to encourage the
policyholder to transfer the coupon to a specified stockbroker on
a regular basis for the purchase of common stocks. These options
may make the coupon policy difficult enough to compare with
more orthodox policies, and the addition of other specialty features, without any specification of the separate premiums attributable to each one, makes the task of comparing prices even more
tricky.
In the nature of things, the coupon benefit is merely a refund
of principal paid in by the policyholder, augmented by interest and
reduced by any expenses that are charged to the coupons. In the
first years, the actual cumulative return is markedly less than the
170

Rearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 18 Qan. 1962).
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cumulative total of premiums because of acquisition costs. The
fact that no coupon is associated with the first-year premium is eloquent testimony to this proposition. Until after a number of years,
the exact number depending on company and policy, there is a net
loss for the policyholder, even without taking interest into account.
If interest earnings are to be considered, the coupon policy method
proves to be an inefficient way to save money. The coupon company
may justifiably reply that the same thing is true of the cash values
and dividends of the orthodox insurer, but, as before, we should
not ignore disadvantages and problems inherent in the coupon
policy merely because the same problems and disadvantages exist
in lesser measure in the orthodox policy. The greater problem
should be dealt with before the lesser, for there is less justification for legal intervention in connection with the latter.
Some conservative life insurance men have put the case against
coupons very strongly. Thus one actuary, a spokesman for a large
life insurance company, said:
"I think the problems with the so-called coupon policies have
resulted purely from the merchandising of them. I was once
talking to a man who was a very successful merchandiser of
special policies .... He told me, further, that there were two
reasons for their success. The first was that the coverage was
easy to misrepresent by the agent. I think that is true. Second,
he said that many of the provisions of the policy had been
deliberately designed to give the prospect ... the impression
that he is taking advantage of the life insurance company .... "111
There is no practicable way to ascertain the extent to which
coupons are the basis of misrepresentation, just as there is no practicable way to measure the extent of deception in the marketing
of the more traditional policies of insurance. It is hard to doubt,
however, that there is more deception in connection with coupon
policies, and possibly a great deal more. Coupons are not added
because they are needed to make the insurance policy meet a need,
but rather they are added because they help to sell despite a higher
price. For the most part, the companies issuing coupon policies
are rather new companies which need sales gimmicks, and there is
a tendency for them to become more conservative as they become
better established.172 Under the circumstances it would be surpris171 1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE
172 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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ing if there were not more misrepresentation than with traditional
policies.
It seems reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the available
evidence, that the misrepresentation problem is serious enough in
the coupon policy that it should be subjected to control, if control
without excessive adverse collateral consequences is possible.

B. The Regulation of Coupon Policies
l. Prohibition
The simplest way to control coupon policies is to forbid them.
That solution has appealed to a number of legislatures and insurance departments when they have been led to take action. As early
as 1913 the Minnesota legislature prohibited coupon policies.178
In more recent years, other legislatures and state insurance departments have adopted a similar policy.174
One of the consequences of outright prohibition is loss of whatever advantages are offered by the coupon policy. It seems useful
to examine the advantages claimed for such contracts, to see
whether there would be a serious loss to the public if they were kept
off the market. The chief advantage urged by the proponents of
coupon policies is flexibility in working out an insurance program.
That flexibility comes from the options available in connection
with the coupon, which are basically the same as the standard
dividend options available from most participating companies.175
The flexibility provided by the coupon policies can thus be attained
through ordinary participating insurance without the disadvantages of the coupons. The coupons offer only a guaranteed savings
component. Even the supporters of the coupon policy say little
more than that. One coupon company stated that the coupon "is
merely a convenience to the insured in his use of the pure endowment feature provided by the policy." 176 If it is merely a convenience, it should not be purchased at too high a price measured in
potential misrepresentation and misunderstanding. Moreover,
there is also an element of inflexibility introduced by the coupon.
The coupons increase the premiums, so that they are large in relation to insurance protection and thus more difficult for the policyholder to maintain except at the cost of using each coupon to
Minn. Laws 1913, ch. 443, § 1, now MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945).
See notes 159, 160 supra.
See NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, WHO WRITES WHAT 222-33 (1962).
Brief for F.L. Ins. Co., In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed
Ins. Rule 2.08 of the Wis. Adm. Code, p. 5 (1962).
173
174
175
176
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reduce premiums. But if they are thus used, they add net cost to
the policy without any corresponding benefit, since the first year
commission on a coupon policy is higher than on a similar policy
without coupons because of the higher gross premiums.177
Despite the fact that the coupon policy offers no significant
advantage over other available policies, and despite the fact that
it is more susceptible to misrepresentation than traditional policies,
one should be cautious about prohibiting it. Prohibition requires
a judgment that the potential harm from coupon policies is substantial. Not only may such policies offer some advantages to an
occasional buyer under certain circumstances, but we should start
with a substantial bias against interfering with freedom of contract,
which is one of the prime values of our legal system. Indeed, it can
be said quite categorically that a heavy burden rests on anyone
who proposes to interfere with the making of contracts as negotiating parties wish to make them. Freedom to make one's own judgments about his contracts is an important value, even if the freedom
will sometimes be used foolishly. The fact that the advantages of
coupon policies are slight and that they involve a serious danger
of misunderstanding justifies outright prohibition only if it is not
possible to make them inoffensive in some less drastic manner.

2. Disclosure
The most objectionable aspect of the coupon policy is not its
form, but the failure to disclose cost. The companies issuing coupon
policies surely work out the premium charges by making separate
computations for coupons and for insurance. If so, they can easily
disclose the charges separately. The only obvious reason for nondisclosure would be to mislead the policyholder, or at least to permit
him to mislead himself. An assertion that the public interest requires a full and fair disclosure of coupon costs to the policyholder
is hard to answer. Of course, disclosure may make it more difficult
for the company to make an attractive sales presentation, for awareness of the actual cost of the coupon would at once dispel all illusions of a high rate of return on the initial investment. The nature
of the coupon as an endowment, or savings account, would at once
become apparent, with a drastic reduction in its marketing appeal.
177 See Memorandum to the Subcommittee on Reserves and Nonforfeiture Values
and Related Matters of Coupon and Similar Policies, June 16, 1963, by Earl Nicholson,
Actuary and Deputy Ins. Comm'r of Nevada. But see Reply Brief for G. L. Ins. Corp.,
In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wis. Adm.
Code, p. 7 (1962).
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As the Wisconsin Department said, "A series of one-year endowments affords a special type of benefit which the average life insurance buyer would seldom purchase if he were in possession of
the full information concerning the premiums paid for the pure
endowment benefits provided." 178 But it is hardly an appealing
argument against a disclosure requirement that the prospect is less
likely to buy if he knows the truth.
The coupon company may retort that it is unfair to compel disclosure of the cost of the coupon if you do not also compel participating companies to disclose the extent to which their premiums
exceed those of nonparticipating companies, i.e., the cost of their
dividends. There is some merit in the argument, but some weaknesses also. First, the coupon is a guaranteed dividend, and thus
clearly separable from the rest of the policy, whereas ordinary
dividends come from the residue of the premium which is left after
paying losses and expenses, and cannot be estimated with complete
accuracy. Second, the nature of the ordinary dividend is fairly well
known, and apart from misleading statements occasionally made
about the size of future dividends by unscrupulous salesmen,
policyholders generally do not suppose that the dividends of participating companies constitute profits. It is not necessary to disabuse them of their illusions, since they have none. This is not to
say that there may not be room for more disclosure in connection
with other insurance as well, but only that the problem is less
serious than with coupon policies, and that one should deal with
the more serious problems first.
Even disclosure has been traditionally beyond the scope of
normal state intervention in contracts. However, there has been
a growing feeling that it is legitimate for the state to compel full
disclosure in connection with any contract where people are apt
to be deceived. There is less need to prohibit contracts or control
their terms if only the truth is made known. The general disclosure
policy of the securities and investment legislation of Congress illustrates the tendency. 179 Moreover, and more important, the philosophy underlying the insurance codes would seem to dictate the
disclosure of the amount charged for the coupon benefit. The whole
insurance business is operated in full public view. Insurance statSee authority cited note 167 supra.
President Kennedy's special message to Congress of March 15, 1962, also expressed
a disclosure philosophy: "Under our system, consumers have a right to expect that pack•
ages will carry reliable and readily usable information about their contents," N.Y. Times,
March 16, 1962, p. 16, col. 8.
178
179
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utes have created machinery to make a public record of the costs
of the various components of insurance policies in nearly all fields.
Several states require companies to keep separate accounts for, and
to set forth in annual statements the gains and losses arising from,
participating and nonparticipating business. Some insurance departments are now trying, through the Blanks Committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, to secure an
amendment to the nationally used annual statement blank to require submission of a separate gain and loss exhibit for participating and nonparticipating business. 180 But more explicitly, such
statutory provisions as the following require disclosure of the kind
with which this section is concerned:
"No figures used in any statement or illustration of future
dividends or of future net cost shall be issued or, used by any
company or agent, unless the same shall be a mathematical calculation based upon assumptions of the policy and dividend
scale in actual use, nor unless each edition thereof ... has been
filed with the commissioner." 181
Furthermore, the law requires each policy to meet the standard
non-forfeiture and valuation requirements. 182 This requires that a
great deal of detailed information be supplied to the regulatory
authority. Insurance departments examine forms, rates charged,
non-forfeiture benefits provided, and valuation standards employed
to determine whether the appropriate requirements have been
met. 183 There is no reason that this comparative cost data should not
be as fully available to the purchaser as to the insurance departmen ts. It would be contrary to the disclosure philosophy that runs
through the insurance statutes to permit the merging of the premium charge of components (coupons, life insurance, return of
premium, etc.) to mask the information the policyholder needs to
make his judgments informed ones.
180 The reform is vigorously opposed by some companies and some departments.
In an April 1963 meeting of the Blanks Committee of the N.A.I.C., a motion to amend
the annual statement blank to require a separate gain and loss exhibit for participating
and nonparticipating business lost by an 8-7 vote. See Joint Gen. Bull. No. 1044, June 4,
1!163, American Life Convention-Life Ins. Ass'n of America.
181 Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 206.51(2) (1957).
182 See standard non-forfeiture requirements, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.181 (Supp.
1962); standard valuation requirements, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.201 (Supp. 1962).
183 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.17(1) (1957), which provides: "No policy of life .••
insurance • • . shall be issued . . . until the commissioner has approved the same
or until there has been filed with him at least 30 days the form of such policy and a
copy_ of any table of rates or statement of benefits furnished to agents or to the
public •••.
0
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But the coupon company may respond that its benefits are so
variable and so complicated that it is not possible to separate the
coupon cost from the cost of the regular insurance. If the benefits
are really so complicated that disclosure of cost is impossible, that
alone would be a devastating indictment of the policy, and would
be a strong argument for prohibition. Moreover, there is reason
to doubt that it would really be so difficult to separate the charges
if there were a will to do so.
The case for full disclosure of the cost of coupons is a strong
one. It might be quite different if the variable benefits represented
commodities of such special value to the consumer as to justify
keeping him uninformed, but to state the proposition is to answer
it. If the components of coupon policies were required to be simplified enough to be priced separately, if terminology were made
more nearly standard to facilitate understanding, and if full disclosure could effectively be compelled, the objectionable aspects
of the present coupon policies would be largely eliminated without
any loss to the policyholders, who could still buy any combination
of savings and insurance they really desired.
In 1961 the Florida Insurance Department issued a regulation
that uses the disclosure solution directly, stating that "no coupon
policy will be approved after this date unless it bears the words on
the face: 'The premium above includes an extra premium of $ ...
for coupon benefits.' " The regulation goes on to specify, later, that
the "statement should be placed in a prominent place on the face
of the policy, preferably near the premium schedule and should be
of large type (18 pt. or better).''184
There are similar regulations in a number of other states.185
The Wisconsin Insurance Department has interpreted a section of
the Wisconsin statute as requiring such disclosure with coupon
policies, though it does not deal explicitly with coupon policies.
The relevant provisions are as follows:
"No policy . . . shall be issued . . . unless it contains . . . the
following provisions: . . . Provision 2, specifying separately
the premium charged for any benefit promised in the policy
other than life or endowment insurance."186
Thus when a life or endowment policy carries with it fringe benefits
such as waiver of premium, accidental death benefit, etc., a separate
184 Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 33, Aug.
185 See regulations cited note 161
186 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.18 (1957).

supra.

8, 1961.
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statement of the premium for each additional benefit must be made.
It has been argued that the words "other than life or endowment
insurance" require disclosure of no more than the gross premium
of the coupon policy as a whole, which is a combination life and
endowment policy. In answer, it has been urged that the true meaning of this provision is apparent only when it is restated:
"No policy ... shall be issued ... unless it contains ... the
following provisions: . . . Provision 2, specifying separately
the premium charged for any benefit promised in the policy
other than life ... insurance ... [if it is a life insurance
policy]"
[and]
"Provision 2, specifying separately the premium charged for
any benefit promised in the policy other than ... endowment
insurance ... [if it is an endowment policy]."187
According to this view, if an endowment policy is issued, the premiums for benefits in addition to the endowment insurance must
be separately stated, and if a basic life insurance policy is issued,
the premiums for benefits in addition to the life insurance must
be separately stated. It would seem to follow that where a policy
combines both life and endowment insurance, the separate premium for each kind of benefit must be separately stated.
This proposed interpretation appears to have been accepted by
the Wisconsin Department of Insurance in its promulgation of
Rule 2.08.188 The rule explicitly forbade the use of coupons. To
prevent evasion of the regulation by stopping the use of coupons
and describing the benefits merely as endowments, the departmental statement included this: "Any policy containing a series of
one-year pure endowments or a series of guaranteed periodic benefits maturing during the premium paying period of the policy .. .
[must state what] the premium charged for such benefits shall be .. .
without deception or misrepresentation."
The disclosure approach seems to provide a direct and simple
method of regulation, and therefore seems at first to be a plausible
solution to the problem. It has the great advantage that it preserves
a large measure of freedom to contract, subject only to the requirement of truth in the sales presentation. However, it also presents
some problems.
187 This construction of the statute was suggested in the Reply Brief for Wis. Life
Convention, pp. 14-15, filed for Hearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule
Ins. 2.08 ijan. 1962).
188 See Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962).
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The most important defect in the disclosure approach, if disclosure is required merely in the policy, is that most agents never
use the policy form in making the sales presentation. Even those
who do now use it could discontinue doing so in order to avoid
the embarrassment of making the disclosure. Information on the
face of the policy thus would be of little aid to the applicant before
he makes his decision to purchase. When he reads the policy it is
too late. Moreover, few buyers of life insurance ever examine an
insurance policy and, of those who do, not many are sufficiently
sophisticated to appreciate the implications of what they see. The
insurance business and the insurance policy are too complex.
A possible remedy for the foregoing weakness of the disclosure
approach is to require the agent to make an affirmative disclosure
of separate cost data in the sales presentation, whether he uses the
policy or not. But to see that this is done would pose a difficult problem of regulation. To see that it is fully done, and fairly done,
would he beyond the financial resources of the most affluent insurance department.
Even if the policy were required to he used, or in fact were used,
in the sales presentation, and even if it did contain a full disclosure
of relevant cost information, there is still no assurance that the total
impact of the presentation, in context, would not be seriously misleading. There still is no assurance that the prospect will have the
ability to assimilate and use all of the data that is presented to him,
usually presented very rapidly in an interview filled with many
subtle pressures. These considerations lead to doubt whether the
disclosure approach provides sufficient protection to the public to
make it adequate. There is no doubt, however, that a requirement
of disclosure both in the policy and in the sales presentation is a
minimum requirement for decent protection of the public against
easily perpetrated and highly probable misrepresentations in connection with coupon policies.

3. Control of Representations
A method of control that has some elements both of disclosure
and of prohibition is the effort to prohibit in a discriminating way
certain kinds of statements in connection with the marketing of
coupon policies. There might he an effort, for example, to prohibit
reference to "profits" or to "income in investment" in connection
with coupons. This is the thrust of a 1959 ruling by the Indiana In-
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surance Department. 189 Illinois Department of Insurance Rule
9.09, section 5(g), forbids and makes unlawful the "stating or implying that the principal amounts payable under coupons represent interest, earnings, return on investment, or anything other than benefits the cost of which is included in the total premium."19O This is an
effort to take all the objectionable features out of the coupon policy
and its marketing, without prohibiting it altogether. The greatest
difficulty which is apparent in such proposals is the difficulty of
policing such prohibitions, because of the large number of synonymous expressions that need to be anticipated and proscribed. If the
prohibition were couched in general language, it would have the
disadvantage of all penal legislation which does not accurately apprise the citizen of the forbidden conduct. If it is made specific, it
must be encyclopedic to catch everything, and then is unlikely to
be sufficiently discriminating for the reason that the use of particular words or phrases is less important than the whole context of
the sales presentation. Moreover, if there is any legitimate use for
the coupon policies, it is in the public interest to permit an effective
sales presentation, so long as it is consistent with the truth. Unless
a more discriminating and skillfully drafted proposal is presented
than any yet made public, such an approach is probably foredoomed to failure. Moreover, even adequate and well articulated
standards do not solve the problem of enforcement; this is the kind
of enforcement which is difficult or even impossible.
Prohibition of coupon policies has some obvious advantages
over the other methods of control. It would be almost completely
effective. The insurance department must approve all policies before they can be issued. Issuance of a coupon policy that does not
have approval from the department would lead to license revocation; enforcement would be as simple as that. But the more subtle
methods of control present difficult enforcement problems. Complaints must be investigated, hearings held, and difficult statutory
or regulatory standards applied. This takes more time, men, and
180 See Ind. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Dec. 16, 1959, which says, "Coupons are not to be
referred to in any manner as 'profits' or 'income' in investment."
100 Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 5(9), Oct. 31, 1962. In its proposed form this section prohibited "stating or implying that the principal amounts payable under coupons
or as endowments represent interest, earnings, return on investment, or anything other
than benefits the cost of which is included in the total premium." Proposed Rule 9.09,
§ 17. (Emphasis added.) The rule as adopted eliminates the italicized words, giving rise to
the possibility of achieving the same thing in another form (i.e., guaranteed annual
dividend payments).
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money than are available to most departments. Under such a
system, even departments with sufficient resources can provide pro- ·
tection only to policyholders who complain. Ferreting out violations without a complaint as a starting point would be an impossible
task. Thus only persons who complain will receive redress; those
who are not sufficiently discerning to appreciate that there is a
basis for complaint will have no protection. All this argues strongly
for prohibition as the only really effective remedy. Against this
must be balanced the advantages of coupon policies, which are
slight, and the value of freedom of contract, which is substantial.
But the value of freedom of contract is not one that can never be
overridden; there seems ample justification here for subjecting it
to the pursuit of fairness in the insurance transaction.
As suggested earlier, the passbook form is little less objectionable than the coupon form. The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, with what seems sufficient justification, has objected to the use of a passbook in connection with coupon or
guaranteed endowment policies since the book
"in itself is likely to create the impression ... that the transaction is one where the premium deposits will be returned in
full, with interest, in a manner similar to that where money
is put in a savings deposit in a bank. Actually, however, the
transaction is primarily in the nature of insurance and the
amount returned to the insured in the event of surrender or
lapse may be very much less than the premiums paid in alone
without any interest." 191
Consequently the New Jersey Department prohibits the use of
passbooks.192
Whether or not it is concluded that coupon policies should be
prohibited, or permitted only with full disclosure of the cost information that would make comparison possible, there is enough
danger of misrepresentation and misunderstanding to justify additional effort in policing the marketing process. Special attention
should be given by complaint bureaus within insurance departN.J. Dep't of Banking and Ins. Reg. I-1963A-2, July 15, 1963.
Ibid. Other states have also shown awareness of misuse of the savings account
idea, e.g., the Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 4(10), Oct. 31, 1962, prohibits "describing
premium payments in language which states the payment is a 'deposit' • • • .'' Some
states follow the Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. Ill-9, ,r l(d), Jan. 19, 1962, which pro•
hibits "references to premiums as 'deposits' in such a manner as to lead the prospective
policyholder to believe that they create a fund which is withdrawable without reference
to the cash surrender or loan provisions of the policy . • • ."
101
192
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ments to ferreting out and punishing misrepresentation by agents
for coupon companies. A previous article has shown how difficult
this task is, and there should be no expectation of great success from
it. 193 It would require no new legislation, for every state seems already to have a statute broad enough to meet the need,1° 4 but what
is needed instead is larger, more competent, and better-financed
complaint bureaus.

VII.

ADDITIONAL SPECIALTY FEATURES AND COMBINATIONS

A. Miscellaneous Specialty Provisions
Three additional specialty features are common enough to be
discussed in this paper. 195 One is the "return of premium" provision, which promises to pay to the beneficiary, in addition to the
face amount of the policy, all premiums paid to the time of the
insured's death. It applies only in case the insured dies within a
specified period from the execution of the policy; permanent coverage of this kind would be actuarially impossible. This is merely
increasing term insurance. The "return of cash value" provision is
similar to the "return of premium" provision, the only difference
being that the measure of the benefit is the cash value of the policy
at the time of death rather than the premiums paid. It, too, is increasing term insurance. The "sight draft" or "immediate cash
draft" provision is a feature promising to pay the beneficiary a
percentage of the face value of the policy if the insured dies before
103 Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. REV.
141 (1961).
10¼ Section 3(a) of the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that "no person
engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, issue, or circulate, or cause
to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, or statement of any
sort misrepresenting the terms of any policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or
advantages promised thereby, or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received
thereon, or shall use any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting
the true nature thereof," and section 3(b) provides that "no person engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before
the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated
or placed before the public, in a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a
notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in any other
way, an advertisement, announcement or statement of any sort containing any assertion,
representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to
any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive, or mis•
leading." For a discussion of the Model Act, see note 94 supra.
105 "These plans are usually on some basic life plan or contain a unique investment
fund, supplemented by level, increasing, or maybe decreasing term, sometimes with frills
of coupons and return premium benefits added which preclude any cost comparison."
1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBUC PRACTICE 56.
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the lapse of a specified period, typically twenty years. Actuarially
this is merely level term insurance, but it has some obvious advantages; it is usually paid without formality and very quickly and
thus is useful to pay the expenses of last illness and death. In fact, a
part of its attractiveness is that it is often attached to the policy in
the form of a sight draft, as its name suggests. The draft may be
taken to a financial institution and presumably will be paid with
a minimum of formalities.
There is nothing inherent in the nature of any of these three
coverages that is objectionable. The first two are merely increasing
term insurance; the third is level term insurance. It is hard to see
why most people would need or want increasing term, since decreasing term corresponds more often to real financial needs. But it is
not objectionable, even if it may not be adapted to most people's
requirements. Clearly, however, none of these coverages add anything to the insurance market that is not otherwise obtainable.
Their elimination would detract not at all from the usefulness
of the insurance institution. The only question for us is whether
the way in which these coverages are used is so misleading that they
should be prohibited or otherwise controlled, not because they are
inherently evil but because the abuses cannot otherwise be prevented.
The return of premium provision and the cash value provision
are attached to policies in that form mainly because they facilitate
a certain kind of sales argument. The introduction to this essay
presented an illustration of the way in which these arguments are
phrased. These forms of coverage are objectionable because they
can very easily be used to facilitate misrepresentation and fraud
in the sale of the policy by making misleading comparisons with
traditional forms.
The sight draft provision is less objectionable. It is difficult
to see how it can be the subject of misrepresentation, except perhaps
as it leads to inaccurate imputations of delay in payment by other
insurance companies. However, this kind of misrepresentation is
easily possible with ordinary insurance policies and it is doubtful
if the sight draft provision is any more likely to be thus misrepresented than other coverages. Thus there seems to be no sound
objection to any of these three coverages as such, but there is a
serious objection in the ordinary use of the first two, for they
encourage unfair and misleading comparisons with other, more
traditional policies. They contribute nothing of value to the in-
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surance market and they facilitate misrepresentation. Actually it
is hard to object to the issuance of increasing term insurance, eo
nomine. It is the use of the terms "return of premium" and "cash
value" that facilitate deception. Perhaps the best the law can do
here without unduly interfering with freedom of contract is to
forbid the use of these and similar terms which lend themselves to
sharp selling practices. There seems to be no justification for prohibition of the sight draft provision at all.
Perhaps one additional provision can properly be dealt with as
a "specialty" provision. That is a provision for the future increase
of benefits. A New Jersey department release speaks of policies
"where the sum insured after ten or twenty years is trebled." 196
This specialty does not seem seriously objectionable on the ground
that it facilitates misrepresentation, or other unfair practices, but
it does enable the issuing company to evade statutory limitations
on first-year expenses. It should probably be forbidden on that
ground alone.
B. Combinations of Provisions
Thus far this section and earlier sections have dealt with the
merits and demerits of the various features separately. However,
almost invariably two or more features are presented at once. This
is especially true with respect to the coverages now under discussion. They rarely exist alone. If any specialty feature is subject to
condemnation when it is considered separately, a fortiori it should
be condemned when it is combined with any other that is also of
doubtful value. Moreover, a feature that is not itself objectionable
may become so because of the cumulative impact of a number of
of features. A specialty company may issue a policy combining the
coupon, charter, profit sharing, return of premium, and sight draft
features. Such a combination has two functions from the point of
view of the company. First, the cumulation of specialty features
adds to the marketing appeal. The more advantages about which
the prospect can be told, the more likely he is to buy. In the sales
presentation with which this essay began, the impact of the cumulation of various features may be seen. Though not every policy contains all of the features, some contain almost all of them. In any
event cumulation is important in most specialty policies.
The second function of the cumulation of specialty features,
from the point of view of the company issuing the policy, is
100

N.J. Proposed Reg. No. I-1963A-l, pp. 1-2.

250

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

the obstruction of meaningful cost comparisons. The premium
is lumped together into a singte gross premium with no indication of the separate cost of each feature. Certainly the actuaries
for the company can separate the charges. Indeed, it would
be irresponsible for an actuary to set a premium for such
a package without arriving at it on the basis of careful computations for each individual component. The cost of conventional
life insurance undoubtedly constitutes the greatest portion of the
premium in most specialty policies. A charge for the coupon benefit is then added; the latter may be constant or may vary from year
to year according to some formula. Finally, on top of the premium
for these two features will be a charge for the level or increasing
term insurance in the form of the specialties dealt with here. These
may be combined in a variety of ways, so that it becomes impossible
to make a fair comparison of the price of a complicated specialty
policy with that of conventional insurance issued by one of the
more conservative companies.
It is usually possible to make a meaningful comparison between
policies issued by different companies when the form of the insurance is roughly comparable. Of course, it is difficult for the average
insured to make such a comparison himself but he can have it made
for him by an insurance counselor. In any event, he can depend
upon agents to explain, so far as possible, the advantages and disadvantages of the policies issued by competing companies. However, when a complicated specialty policy is to be compared with
conventional insurance, the comparison becomes extremely difficult and therefore meaningless to the ordinary policyholder.
The combination of the premiums into a single premium is
done deliberately in order to preclude cost comparisons. The life
insurance market is fiercely competitive on the price level, and
new, small companies tend to seek protection from the full force
of the competition.
Earlier in this article an effort was made to decide just how
objectionable each specialty feature is and to make recommendations for its prohibition, its control, or for the neutrality of the law
with respect to it. At this point some conclusions must be added on
the combination of specialty features, for although the article has
generally suggested stringent control measures or even prohibition,
its suggestions will not necessarily prevail. On the whole, perhaps
the best solution to the problem presented by combinations of
specialty features is to treat each feature separately when consider-
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ing whether to prohibit it or merely to regulate it. The significantly
distinctive factor here is the combination of charges in a lump sum.
It seems to be very important to prevent the concealment of the
separate cost of each feature, and thereby to enable the policyholder to make cost comparisons. This is no less true because most
policyholders are incapable of making such comparisons or will not
take the trouble to do so. At least comparison should be made possible. For combinations, therefore, even if a decision is made not
to control or prohibit the component parts, the law should at least
require a separate statement of the cost of each feature. This should
create no real difficulties for specialty companies other than to
make sales presentations somewhat less effective. But the diminution in effectiveness will result from the decreased ease of misrepresentation or misleading statements; hence this diminished
impact can be no proper objection to this control device. Although
it is possible to argue that some combinations ought to be prohibited even when the component parts need not be, it would
generally be so difficult to devise rules to handle such problems
appropriately and without unnecessary prohibitions that the solution to combinations should be couched in terms of the separation
of charges only.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The subject of this article is a fast-moving and timely field
in which noteworthy developments will undoubtedly appear in
the interval between the completion of the writing and its publication. Indeed, between the time the body of the article was
finished and the writing of this concluding section, an important
event has served to underscore this point. This occurrence was the
action taken by the Ohio Insurance Department to stop the use of
a chain letter system for the merchandising of life insurance policies.107 If A, having first purchased a particular policy, induces B
to buy one also, then A receives a bonus of 150 dollars. If B then induces C to purchase one, A gets fifty dollars. Finally, if C induces
D to purchase, A gets twenty-five dollars. Meanwhile, B and C receive their turns at the larger sums. Obviously the first year premium has to include an additional amount of approximately 250
197 See J. of Commerce, June 12, 1963, p. 8, cols. 6•7. Even more recently, a "new
plan to lease life insurance" has been announced. J. of Commerce, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 8;
Ins. Advocate, Sept. 14, 1963, p. 38.
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dollars to pay these bonuses. The Ohio Department castigated the
plan as a system of rebates, but perhaps it is more nearly akin to the
profit-sharing or charter policies heretofore discussed. In any case,
there seems little doubt that the practice is objectionable and that
the Ohio Department was justified in its suppression.
The changeable character of the field emphasizes the difficulty
of dealing with it adequately. For example, if coupon policies are
forbidden eo nomine, they merely become pass book policies, or
guaranteed dividend policies; with abandonment of the form of
coupons the prohibition becomes ineffective. While abolition of
the coupons does in fact eliminate some of the difficulty, it does
not eliminate all of it. Any statutes or regulations developed to
treat these problems must contemplate the probability of constantly evolving forms, or at least terminology, even if the reality
behind the form remains much the same.
The number of distinct specialty policies that could be formed
from the various possible permutations and combinations of specialty features is staggering. For this reason, it would be impracticable to deal in an article such as this with each specialty policy as
a whole, though in some measure it is unfair to judge it on any other
basis. However, the requirements of practicality lead to the separate
treatment of each specialty feature as if it stood alone, despite the
fact that it seldom does. By its nature, therefore, this article can be
only a starting point for discussion, not a blueprint for action.
Fairness, reasonableness, and equity in the insurance marketwhat one might call "purity of the market"-states the approximate
content of a fundamental goal of insurance law that urges us in
the direction of close regulation or even of prohibition of the specialty policies described above. To be weighed against it are the
values of freedom of contract and freedom of access to the insurance
market for new companies. The latter are values of considerable
importance in a free economic system, moving us to caution before
deciding in favor of intervention in the insurance market. But they
are not absolute values; it is quite generally agreed at this date that
they only compel the advocate of intervention to make a case for
the necessity of proposed action.
Both of these latter values have their justification largely in
the economic advantage thought to flow from them. Part of the case
for intervention in connection with specialty policies lies in the fact
that the American life insurance market is not in desperate need
of new company formations. The large number of companies now
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operating in the United States, and the rapid rate at which the number has grown in recent decades, suggests that some restriction upon
access to the market would do no harm and might possibly be desirable.108 Restriction can come about through the raising of minimum requirements for entry, especially capital and surplus requirements, or it can come about by making the conditions of operation
in the market less attractive to new companies, such as by restricting
or prohibiting the kinds of contracts that may be offered for sale.
If the situation were to change, and the higher standards of morality
imposed by the law led to a decline in the number of companies
operating in the market, then a sound public policy might call for
a relaxation in the terms of access or some other form of encouragement to new enterprise. However, it seems unlikely that even complete abolition of all specialty pqlicies would prevent the formation
of enough new companies to satisfy our needs.
Freedom of contract is also to be justified in economic terms, in
large part. This is expressed by the specialty companies themselves
when they speak of the desirability of having the "boundaries of
'public interest' established by policyholder demands and not by
departmental regulation made without consideration of individual
or group needs and desires for protection."199 Of course they also
put their case in more selfish terms when they talk of the right of
the small companies "to compete freely insofar as [their] conduct
is not injurious to the public."200 The economic advantage that is
thought to come from freedom of contract is the development of
new and better products at lower cost. But so far as cost is concerned, there is now complete freedom to price life insurance at as
low a level as the individual company can justify, subject only to the
need to meet the reserve standards set up by law. In fact, the use of
specialty policies is not aimed at reduction of cost but more frequently at masking an increase in cost so that it will not play its
accustomed role in a free market. Partly the increase is sought in
order to provide a larger margin for acquisition costs-mainly the
108 See Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471, 514 (1961), for a discussion of the
"need test" as applied in some European countries. New companies, whether domestic
or foreign, are simply not admitted to the market in some countries unless there is a
need for them and the insurance commissioner thinks the market will benefit by their
presence. While there would be objection to this restriction in the American context,
it is not unthinkable to close the market to new company formations. It is done in
some other fields by requiring a "certificate of convenience and necessity" before permitting an entrepreneur to begin business activity.
100 National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 11, 1962, pp. 15, 21, col. 1.
200 Ibid.
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commission of the agent. For instance, one "specialty" that has received only casual mention here is the provision of an increased
face value or other benefit, beginning at some time in the future.
The New Jersey Insurance Department speaks of policies in which
the "sum insured after ten or twenty years is trebled." 201 Both this
increase in benefit and the coupon provision enlarge substantially
the first-year expense allowed under the Standard Nonforfeiture
Law.
If the freedom to issue specialty policies produced new and better products, that fact would go far to justify their use. On the contrary, however, the asserted imagination and aggressiveness of the
vigorous new companies has not succeeded in producing anything
really new. The reason is that there is little new to produce; all life
insurance policies are combinations in varying proportions of protection and saving. A term insurance policy and a savings account
can do virtually anything any life insurance policy can do. No specialty policy discussed here provides anything new enough and
valuable enough to demonstrate the importance of preserving freedom of contract in this market. The situation is quite unlike that
in fire and casualty insurance, where there have been new developments of considerable value within recent years. But one must not
be too dogmatic about this point. The most that can be said with
assurance is that the particular forms discussed in this article have
no great value. The way should always be kept open for any really
new ideas in life insurance. Regulation or prohibition should,
therefore, be restricted to carefully defined and demonstrably objectionable contracts.
It is the necessity of such restriction that makes the task of control such a difficult one. This article has not discussed the administrative law problems relating to the competence of the insurance
department, partly because of their complexity, but also because
it seems probable that carefully drafted statutes can constitutionally
give the departments all the power they really need. Because of the
ingenuity of entrepreneurs, prohibitions or restrictions defined in
detail in statutes seem unduly cumbersome. Almost inevitably the
departments must be entrusted with the power to act within broad
limits. Practically, most departments can do so already. The power
to require policy forms to be submitted for approval before they can
be used is not an unlimited power, but for all practical purposes it
201

N.J. Proposed Reg. No. I-1963A-l, pp. 1-2.
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enables departments to deny approval on any ground reasonably
related to the public welfare. Under existing statutes, they can also
act to forbid a wide variety of marketing practices.
The commonly used specialty policies all seem objectionable.
Although the tontine feature does not seem nearly so bad in itself
as it is often pictured, it makes little contribution to the market and
could be eliminated without damage to the public. Moreover, it is
subject to serious abuse, both because of the danger of the dissipation of the inadequately controlled deferred dividends and because
of the severe danger of misrepresentation. Profit-sharing and charter policies also encourage serious misrepresentation. Moreover,
they violate the fundamental public policy in favor of equity in
insurance pricing, which is also embodied in statutory prescription
in most states. The coupon policy, too, lends itself to misrepresentation, especially because of the failure to disclose cost information.
It would be possible to require that separate cost information be
provided; theoretically that would be sufficient to prevent the harm
that arises from the misrepresentation, but as a practical matter it
would be difficult effectively to police the requirement to see that
the policyholder had the information at a time sufficiently early to
make any difference in his decision. The conclusion has thus been
reached that each of the three major classes of specialty features
should be abolished. The minor ones-the "return of premium"
provision-the "return of cash value" provision, and the "sight
draft" provision, do not seem very dangerous. However, they contribute little that is not already available in the market, if they
contribute anything at all. Therefore, abolition is a small price to
pay for the greater purity of the market that would result. The
ultimate conclusion reached by this study is, therefore, that the
entire range of specialty policies available in the life insurance
market, as described herein, are growths of little value that can be
pruned away without loss to the public. Hopefully this can be
done without putting the industry in a "strait jacket," as the
National Association of Life Companies fears. If, after careful definition, the specialty policies are forbidden by name, there should
be no question of a "strait jacket." If the insurance department remains watchful and ready to extend its prohibited list as new forms
appear, there is no need for the sweeping prohibition that would
prevent the development of something new and valuable. The
only question then is whether a particular form should be on the
list or not. As it appears in a submitted policy form the question
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can be decided. Of course this assumes competence in the policyexamining section, which is not always there.
Where to draw lines between prohibited and permitted forms
is a difficult question. It seems clear, for example, that coupons
'should be prohibited, but it is not obvious that guaranteed dividends should be, or that a series of annual endowments should be.
But it is not necessary that there be merely a twofold division of the
field of life insurance between absolutely prohibited and unrestrictedly permitted coverages. There can also be, and should be, an
intermediate area in which coverages are permitted under restrictions. For example, guaranteed dividends might be permitted when
accompanied by a sufficiently clear separate statement of costs.
If the question were completely new, a forceful argument might
easily be made that life insurance companies should never have
become involved in the "banking" business to the extent that they
have-over 100,000,000,000 dollars. But that decision was made
long ago and can hardly be considered open at this date. Since all
legal reserve companies are deeply involved in "banking" already,
it would be discriminatory to go too far in preventing the slightly
different forms of "banking" engaged in by coupon companies.
It is the special danger of misrepresentation, and not objection to
high savings policies per se, that justifies the prohibition of coupons. However, there seems to be no sound argument whatever
against a requirement that costs be disclosed as fully as is practicable
under the circumstances. To the insistence of coupon companies
that it is unfair for them to be required to disclose separate costs if
participating companies are not also required to separate the cost
of the policy from the excess in the premium from which dividends
are paid, it can be answered that such a disclosure would undoubtedly be desirable and quite possibly should be compelled if
a formula can be devised under which it can practically be accomplished. But that is the subject of another article, not of this one;
more important problems should be solved before spending time
and effort on less important ones.
The danger most apparent in the specialty provisions is that
of misrepresentation. A number of states have sought to control
the misrepresentation while continuing to permit the coverage.
This is a plausible approach, but with one serious weakness. It is
confronted directly by a consideration which one might call a value
of the legal system, and in a sense it is a "value." But more realistically, it is only a practical necessity. This is economy of means in
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the regulatory process. Solutions must be devised that do not make
demands for extensive use of manpower, although it is unfortunate
to be governed by this necessity. Although economy in government
is a value no one should decry, the amount spent in the regulation
of insurance is pitifully small in relation to the importance of the
business. But as a practical matter, all insurance departments are
terribly overburdened and, until that day when the sheep and the
lion lie down together, will continue to be overburdened. Legislatures simply do not and will not supply enough funds for the
departments to do the jobs well which are assigned to them. Consequently, all proposed solutions to problems must face the economy test. Relative to the means probably available to the department, will this remedy be reasonably effective? Tested by that
standard, it is clear that the regulation of marketing practices will
achieve far less to purify the market at much higher cost than the
outright prohibition of certain provisions. Prohibition is administered relatively surely and inexpensively in connection with the
approval of policy forms. On the other hand, regulation of marketing practices would require an expensive enforcement program.
Disclosure lies between them, with respect to ease of enforcement.
Its value depends, however, on the understanding of the policyholder, and that would be substantially enhanced by disclosure only
if terminology were made more nearly uniform in the insurance
business. But that is quite another question that cannot be here
pursued further.
Life insurance performs a great service to the community. It
is an essential prerequisite to the working of an industrial society;
if it is not adequately provided by private enterprise, then undoubtedly government agencies will fill the gaps. Life insurance
is especially important to the lower and middle classes of the population. In view of the complexity of the life insurance contract,
these groups of people cannot understand it and need special protection; hence it is important to our society that reasonable efforts
be made to ensure reasonable "purity of the market" in life insurance. The regulator's task is not to prevent new developments that
may prove to be of value to the public, but to prevent the use of
mere gimmicks that do no more than complicate the policy and
make it harder to understand, or make it more expensive. The balance among conflicting values is one difficult to maintain, but the
effort must be made. Responsible and intelligent supervision of the
insurance market is an important activity of government. It de-
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serves the best efforts of regulators and the best thinking of all
those interested in it.202
202 Several items have come to our attention too late to be incorporated into the
text or regular body of footnotes. Related to the textual discussion of the cost of small,
new companies are two cost studies: Business Men's Assurance Company of America,
Young Company Expense Study, Reinsurance Bulletin, August 1962; and Life Insurance
Company Cost Study, August 1963, compiled by the Life Insurance Company of Kentucky.
The latter study concentrated on specialty policy companies.
In an address by Harold Franklin at the Annual Seminar of Association for Advanced
Life Underwriting, as reported in the National Underwriter, Life Ed., Dec. 29, 1962, p. 2,
col. 2, he pointed out several factors tending to narrow the competitive advantage of a
large over a small company. Small companies benefit from institutional advertising. Most
persons purchase life insurance from the agent rather than from the company, thereby
negating the advantage of an established name. Because of the improvement in mortality
experience, a new company's experience should be better than that of the industry as a
whole. A new company has an advantage in interest earnings since its investment port·
folio does not include fixed dollar investments reflecting the low interest yields of the
postwar period.
Two recent coupon regulations have been promulgated. N.J. Dep't of Banking and
Ins., Reg. No. I-1963A-l, July 15, 1963, among other things, prohibits the use of coupons,
prohibits guaranteed annual endowments being contingent on payment of a premium due
when the endowment would otherwise be payable, requires separate disclosure of the
premium charged for the guaranteed annual endowment, etc. Reg. I-1963A-2 pro•
hibits use of books resembling savings deposit books in banks in connection with policies
containing guaranteed annual endowments. Mass. Dep't of Banking and Ins., Div. of Ins.,
Reg. Sept. 17, 1963, among other things, prohibits payment of guaranteed annual pure
endowments contingent on payment of premium due when such benefit would otherwise
be payable, and prohibits coupon policies.
At a recent N.A.I.C. Zone IV meeting, Sept. 29-0ct. 1, 1963, Mr. James Douds announced that the NALU was conducting an independent study of specialty policies. Vve
have not yet seen the results of that study.

